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Abstract
We study the effects of innovations on income distribution in cap-
italist economies characterised by a drive to accumulate. Consistent
with the basic intuitions of Marx’s theory of technical change, we show
that there is no obvious relation between ex-ante profitable innovations
and the income distribution that actually emerges in equilibrium, and
individually rational choices of technique do not necessarily lead to
optimal outcomes. Innovations may even cause the disappearance of
all equilibria. Methodologically, it is not possible to fully understand
the ‘creative destruction’ induced by innovations without capturing
the dialectic between individual choices and aggregate outcomes, and
the complex network of relations typical of capitalist economies.
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1 Introduction
What is the relation between technical change and the distribution of income
and wealth in capitalist economies? More specifically, is there a relation be-
tween innovation and the dynamics of profitability? Both questions have
been central in the theorising of classical, as well as early neoclassical, econo-
mists.
According to Ricardo, Mill, and Walras, for example, the equilibrium
rate of profit (or rate of interest) tends to fall because of decreasing returns
to scale due to the scarcity of a primary production factor, such as land.
Famously, Marx [12, 13] rejected this explanation and argued instead that the
profit rate tends to fall whenever capital-using and labour-saving innovations
— the kind of innovations that have characterised capitalist economies — are
adopted. Even if such innovations are cost-reducing, the argument goes, once
they are generally adopted they tend to lower the labour content of goods,
and thus — in Marx’s theory — prices and profits, which leads the profit rate
to fall provided the real wage and the labour share are constant.
The classicals’, and early neoclassicals’, law of the falling rate of profit
has been put into question. Starting at least from Schumpeter [21], countless
authors have emphasised the role of innovation as the main driver of economic
growth and as the key countervailing force avoiding rates of profit and interest
to fall, thanks to the creation of temporary monopolies and abnormal profits.1
The most direct, and significant, criticism of Marx’s theory of the falling
rate of profit, however, has been developed by Nobuo Okishio [14] in a seminal
paper. The so-calledOkishio Theorem (henceforth, OT) shows that if the real
wage rate is fixed at the (historically and culturally determined) subsistence
level, then any cost-reducing technical change will necessarily increase the
equilibrium profit rate. In other words, under a set of assumptions consistent
with both Marx’s and Schumpeter’s theoretical framework, OT proves that
the Marxian theory of the falling rate of profit is invalid.
This result has sparked substantial controversy and a vast literature.
Some critics have rejected OT on exegetical grounds, arguing that the as-
sumptions, definitions, or indeed the very mathematical approach adopted
by Okishio are not Marx’s. Others have provided ‘refutations’ of OT by con-
structing more or less plausible scenarios in which some profit rate is shown
1More recent contributions in a Schumpeterian vein include, among the many others,
Romer [16], Grossman and Helpman [8], Aghion and Howitt [3], and Acemoglu [1, 2].
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to fall even if the wage rate remains constant.2 Another strand of literature
has shown that capital-using labour-saving innovations can lead to a falling
profit rate if the wage share remains constant.3
The theoretical relevance of the conditions under which the profit rate is
shown to fall in this literature is sometimes unclear. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, however, these contributions suffer from two general limitations, which
they share with Okishio’s [14] original analysis: both individual choices con-
cerning the development and adoption of new techniques, and the structure
of the economy, including the complex web of connections that characterise
capitalist economies, are severely underspecified. Innovations are usually as-
sumed to simply appear and, if they are cost-reducing, to be automatically
and universally adopted. The economy is assumed to reach an equilibrium
which is defined as simply requiring a uniform profit rate across sectors.
The problem with this conceptualisation is not its simplicity: all theoret-
ical models — formal or otherwise — inevitably abstract from some features of
social reality. The problem is that it misses some key features of the process
of technical change in capitalist economies. First, at a general conceptual
level, Marx has a dialectical view of capitalist economies in which aggregate
outcomes are often the unintended consequence of individual actions. What
is optimal ex ante for individuals is not necessarily optimal ex post at either
the individual or the aggregate level. His theory of technical progress and of
the effects of technical change on profitability is fundamentally based on this
view of the complex relation between the micro and macro levels.
Second, and related, in both Marx’s and Schumpeter’s theories, inno-
vations are not smoothly and automatically adopted in the economy even
when they are cost-reducing at current prices. Technical progress has an in-
herently disruptive nature — it involves a process of ‘creative destruction’, in
Schumpeter’s words — in that consolidated practices are abandoned and old
equilibria disappear. Innovations have general equilibrium effects that sim-
ple comparative statics exercises cannot really capture: technical progress
leads to changes in equilibrium prices, which in turn feedback on individual
decisions in potentially unpredictable ways.
Interestingly, in later contributions, Okishio [15] himself has raised some
doubts on the relevance of OT as a characterisation of the long run tendencies
2The literature is too vast for a comprehensive list of references. For a (partial) survey,
see Veneziani [23, 24].
3See, for example, Franke [7] and the references therein.
3
of capitalist economies. On the one hand, he has argued that the assumption
of a fixed (subsistence) wage seems empirically unrealistic and theoretically
restrictive. For, in the dynamic process of capital accumulation, the real
wage rate would increase unless population grew faster than capital. Further,
Okishio [15] has acknowledged that OT is essentially a comparative statics
result, which compares two equilibrium rates of profits (before and after
the introduction of a new technique), but does not consider the complex
transition from the old equilibrium to the new one.
In this paper, we build on Okishio’s [15] insights and provide an alterna-
tive framework to analyse the interaction of innovation, capital accumulation,
and factor income distribution. To be specific, we set up a dynamic general
equilibrium model in which, in every period, agents exchange goods and ser-
vices on a number of interrelated markets. Propertyless agents simply supply
labour, while capitalists activate optimal production activities and adopt pro-
duction techniques yielding the maximum rate of profit. Unlike in standard
neoclassical models, production takes time. Hence, capital and labour are
traded at the beginning of each production period, while consumption goods
are exchanged after production has taken place.
We adopt a classical view of the functioning of capitalism and assume the
economy to be driven by an accumulation motive,4 and conceive of capital
as a vector of reproducible commodities (rather than as a single aggregate
factor, as in standard growth theory). A production technique, in this frame-
work, is a blueprint describing how to combine a vector of produced inputs
with labour in order to produce outputs. At the beginning of each produc-
tion period, the production set consists of a set of known blueprints which
agents can choose from in order to activate production. When innovations do
emerge, they expand the production set by generating new blueprints that
may be used first at the beginning of the next available production period.
As in the literature on OT, we do not explicitly consider R&D activities
and the process of generating innovations. Unlike in the literature on OT,
however, we provide an explicit, thorough analysis both of individual choices
after a new technique is discovered, and of the general equilibrium effects
of innovation on both prices and income distribution. We design a thought
experiment by supposing the economy to start out on a balanced growth
path characterised by an equilibrium price vector and an optimally chosen
4“Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets!” (Marx [12], Ch.24, Sect.
3).
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technique that — absent any perturbations — would persist over time. What
are the effects of profitable, cost reducing innovations in this context? If (i) a
new equilibrium exists in which (ii) the new technique is adopted and (iii) the
wage rate remains unchanged, then OT continues to hold (Theorem 2). Aside
from this rather special case, however, our findings are much more nuanced
and perhaps surprising, and at a broad theoretical level, they vindicate some
of Marx’s original intuitions.
First, innovations may have negative welfare effects in capitalist economies:
while all cost-reducing capital-using and labour-saving innovations improve
labour productivity (as measured by the Leontief employment multipliers),
there exist profitable innovations which, if universally adopted in equilibrium,
would unambiguously worsen labour productivity (Proposition 2).
Second, the distributive implications of technical progress depend on the
general equilibrium effects of technical change. If innovations maintain, or
create, a reserve army of the unemployed, then technical change leads to an
increase in the equilibrium profit rate as predicted by OT (Theorem 6). This
conclusion does not hold in general, though. If a new equilibrium with full
employment of productive factors is reached, then the effect of innovation on
distribution is a priori unclear, as there exist (infinitely) many profit rates
and wage rates that can be supported in equilibrium. Indeed, it is even pos-
sible for either the equilibrium wage rate or the profit rate to decrease com-
pared to the equilibrium with the old technology (Theorem 5). The actual
distributional outcome depends on the equilibrium selection mechanism.5
Perhaps more surprisingly, a cost-reducing change of technique may yield
a decrease in the equilibrium profit rate. If the new technique significantly
increases labour productivity while it makes the present capital stock abun-
dant relative to population, then its introduction drives the equilibrium profit
rate to zero (Theorems 7 and 9). Contrary to OT, and much like in Marx’s
original intuition, an innovation that is profitable for individual capitalists
at current prices yields, after it is universally adopted, a change in the equi-
librium price vector — and consequently in individual behaviour — eventually
leading the equilibrium profit rate to decrease. Indeed, the equilibrium profit
5This result is reminiscent of the well known indeterminacy of the functional distribu-
tion of income in Sraffa’s [22] system of production prices. Nonetheless, the indeterminacy
in Theorem 5 is quite different: it is the result of the inter-period equilibrium transition
triggered by innovations, and it obtains under a more general equilibrium notion which
includes the standard excess demand conditions for all markets. For recent analyses of
indeterminacy in Sraffian models, see Mandler [11] and Yoshihara and Kwak [26].
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rate falls (albeit not necessarily to zero) even if the new technique worsens
labour productivity, though in this case the mechanism is subtler and less
intuitive, as the innovation is not adopted: it has a pure general equilibrium
effect leading to capitalists to opt for an older technique (Theorem 8).
Third, innovations can be highly disruptive and the process of ‘creative
destruction’ is anything but smooth, as Schumpeter [21] emphasised. Unlike
in the standard literature on OT, which assumes that any new technique
improving profitability is adopted, we show that there exist cost-reducing,
capital-saving and labour-using innovations that destroy the existing equi-
librium and yet are not adopted in the new equilibrium (Theorem 3). Inno-
vations may paradoxically lead older techniques to become profitable again,
due to changes in equilibrium prices (Theorem 8). Even more radically, inno-
vations may lead to the disappearance of equilibrium altogether: the process
of creative destruction entails a disequilibrium dynamics.6
Finally, our analysis suggests that the falling rate of profit cannot be
fully understood if capital is conceived of as a single, homogeneous factor
of production, as in standard neoclassical models. In section 7 below, we
highlight an interesting, novel connection between technical changes leading
to a falling rate of profit and the so-called reswitching of techniques and
capital reversing identified in classical capital theory (Sraffa [22]), which can
be analysed only if capital is understood as a vector of produced inputs as
argued in the Cambridge capital controversy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present
the economy and the equilibrium concept. Section 4 introduces the notion
of profitable technical change and derives a generalisation of OT. Section 5
introduces a classification of the types of profitable changes of techniques.
Section 6 examines various types of equilibrium transitions triggered by such
changes of techniques. Section 7 characterises the conditions under which
technical change leads to a falling rate of profit. Section 8 concludes.
6In his analysis of choice of technique in linear economies with joint production, Bidard
[4] defines an algorithm which ensures the convergence to an optimal technique in a given
class of production sets. This suggests that, as in our model, outside of that class the algo-
rithm may not converge leading to a disequilibrium dynamics. The mechanism underlying
the non-existence of equilibrium is, however, different: in our model joint production is
ruled out and non-convergence derives instead from the interaction between individually
optimal choice of technique and the general equilibrium effects of innovations.
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2 The economy
Consider a closed economy with n commodities produced and consumed. In
order to focus on the relation between technical change, optimal behaviour,
and profitability we assume that the set of commodities is constant over time.
2.1 Technology, innovation, and knowledge
At the beginning of each production period t = 1, 2, . . ., there is a finite set of
production techniques Bt, the base set, which consists of Leontief techniques
(At, Lt), where At is a n × n nonnegative, productive, and indecomposable
matrix of material input coefficients, and Lt is a 1 × n positive vector of
labour coefficients. The set of all available production techniques at t, Pt,
consists of all convex combinations of the techniques in Bt, so that Bt ⊆ Pt.
The base set Bt contains the blueprints that can be used at t to produce
the n goods — the technically feasible ways of combining inputs in order
to produce outputs.7 The stock of knowledge does not depreciate: once a
production technique is discovered, it remains available for agents to use.
But knowledge can be accumulated. Formally, Bt−1 ⊆ Bt holds in general,
and technical progress takes place between period t − 1 and period t if and
only if Bt−1 ⊂ Bt and (A∗t , L∗t ) ∈ Bt\Bt−1: (A∗t , L∗t ) is an innovation, which
is available at the beginning of t.8 Because we are interested in the effects
of innovation on profitability in competitive market economies, we suppose
that, at the beginning of t, information both about Bt−1 and about any new
technique (A∗t , L
∗
t ) ∈ Bt\Bt−1 is available to all agents in the economy.
At all t, for any (At, Lt) ∈ Bt, let δ(At) = 11+Π(At) denote the Frobenius
eigenvalue of At. By the assumptions on Bt, Π(At) > 0 and δ(At) < 1.
2.2 Agents
We study some fundamental dynamic laws of capitalist economies charac-
terised by a drive to accumulate, and assume that agents aim to maximise
7This is a generalisation of Jones’s [9] model of ‘ideas’.
8In discrete time models, there is always a degree of arbitrariness concerning the timing
of decisions, and the economy analysed in this paper is no exception. Yet our key insights
are robust to small perturbations in the timing of decisions. The assumption that only
one new technique can emerge in a period is for simplicity and yields no loss of generality.
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their wealth subject to reaching a minimum consumption standard.9
Let R (resp., R+) denote the sets of (resp., nonnegative) real numbers.
In period t, let the set of agents be denoted by Nt, with cardinality Nt
and generic element ν. At the beginning of each t, each agent ν ∈ Nt
is endowed with a (possibly zero) vector of produced goods determined by
past decisions, ωνt−1 ∈ Rn+ , whose distribution in the economy is given byΩt−1 = ¡ωνt−1¢ν∈Nt ∈ RnNt+ , and with one unit of labour.10 Let 0 = (0, . . . , 0).
We follow Roemer [19, 20] in making the time structure of production
explicit: “Production takes time. One enters inputs today and gets outputs
tomorrow. Furthermore, capitalists, facing [today’s prices], are constrained
in their choice of activity levels by the value of their capital ... There is
no credit market, and they must pay for inputs today” (Roemer [19], p.18).
Within each period of production, market exchanges take place at two points
in time: productive inputs are traded and labour contracts are signed at the
beginning of the period; outputs are traded and wages are paid at the end.
Therefore let pbt ∈ Rn+ be the vector of beginning-of-period commodity
prices, and for every agent ν ∈ Nt, let (peνt , weνt ) ∈ Rn+1+ be agent ν’s ex-
pectation about the vector of commodity prices and the nominal wage rate
ruling at the end of period t, denoted by (pt, wt). Because agents have the
same preferences and possess the same information, in what follows we as-
sume them to have identical expectations and drop the superscript ν for
simplicity. Formally, (peνt , w
eν
t ) = (p
eμ
t , w
eμ
t ) = (p
e
t , w
e
t ) for all ν,μ ∈ Nt.
Given
¡
pbt , p
e
t , w
e
t
¢
, at the beginning of each t, every agent ν ∈ Nt chooses
her labour supply, lνt , and uses wealth, W
ν
t = p
b
tωνt−1, either to buy goods δνt
(spending pbtδνt ) for sale at the end of the period or to finance production.
In the latter case, each agent chooses a production technique, (Aνt , L
ν
t ) ∈
Pt, which is activated at level xνt by investing (part of) W νt to finance the
operating costs of the activities she activates, pbtA
ν
t x
ν
t , and by hiring workers
Lνt x
ν
t , which are paid ex post the expected amount w
e
tL
ν
t x
ν
t .
11 Thus, expected
gross revenue at the end of t is petx
ν
t +w
e
t l
ν
t +p
e
tδνt , which is used to pay wages
9The model is a dynamic extension of Roemer’s [20] accumulating economy with a
labour market.
10In every period t, we take the distribution of endowments as exogenously given and
abstract from all issues related to bequests and the endowment of newly born agents. This
is without any loss of generality and none of our results depends on it.
11The model can allow agents to operate production activities with their own capital as
self-employed producers. Given the convexity of the optimisation programmeMP νt below,
this makes no difference to our results.
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and finance accumulation, petωνt , subject to purchasing a consumption bundle
b ∈ Rn+, b > 0,12 per unit of labour performed.13
Let 4 ≡ ©p ∈ Rn+ | pb = 1ª: 4 is the set of normalised price vectors.
Formally, in every period t, given
¡
pbt , p
e
t , w
e
t
¢
∈ 42×R+, agents are assumed
to choose (Aνt , L
ν
t ), ξνt ≡ (xνt , lνt , δνt ), and ωνt to solve:14
MP νt : max
(Aνt ,L
ν
t );ξνt ;ωνt
petωνt
subject to
[pet − wetLνt ]xνt + wet lνt + petδνt = petblνt + petωνt (1)
pbtA
ν
t x
ν
t + p
b
tδνt = pbtωνt−1, (2)
0 5 lνt 5 1, (3)
(Aνt , L
ν
t ) ∈ Pt; (4)
xνt , δνt ,ωνt ∈ Rn+. (5)
In other words, we focus on a temporary resource allocation problem
whereby agents choose an optimal plan in each production period. The
analysis of the transition process sparked by technical progress is developed
in section 4 below, where we explicitly consider the change in production
techniques occurring after the emergence of an innovation.
Finally, let vt ≡ Lt(I −At)−1 denote the standard vector of employment
multipliers. In the rest of the paper, we assume that for all (At, Lt) ∈ Bt,
1 > vtb holds: this is a basic condition for the productiveness of the economy.
3 Equilibrium
An accumulation economy at period t is a set of agents,Nt, a set of production
techniques, Bt, a consumption bundle, b, and a distribution of productive
endowments, Ωt−1, and is denoted as E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1).Let xt ≡ Pν∈Nt xνt ,
and let a similar notation hold for δt, ωt, and lt. Similar to Roemer [19, 20],
the equilibrium notion of this economy can be defined.
12Vector inequalities: for all x, y ∈ Rn, x = y if and only if xi = yi (i = 1, . . . , n); x ≥ y
if and only if x = y and x 6= y; x > y if and only if xi > yi (i = 1, . . . , n).
13Given our analytical focus on the relation between technical change and profitability,
we do not explicitly analyse the agents’ consumption choices and treat b as a parameter.
This is without significant loss of generality.
14Constraints (1) and (2) are written as equalities without loss of generality.
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Definition 1: A competitive equilibrium (CE) for E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1) is a vec-
tor
¡
pbt , pt, wt
¢
∈ 42 ×R+ and associated ((Aνt , Lνt ); ξνt ;ωνt )ν∈Nt such that:
(a) ((Aνt , L
ν
t ); ξνt ;ωνt ) solves MP νt , for all ν ∈ Nt (individual optimality);
(b)
P
ν∈Nt A
ν
t x
ν
t + δt 5 ωt−1 (social feasibility of production);
(c)
P
ν∈Nt L
ν
t x
ν
t = lt (labour market);
(d) xt + δt =Pν∈Nt bLνt xνt + ωt with xt > 0 (commodity markets);
(e) pt = pet = p
b
t and wt = w
e
t (realised expectations).
In other words, at a CE, (a) all agents optimise; (b) aggregate capital is suf-
ficient for production plans; (c) the labour market is in equilibrium; (d) the
total supply of commodities is sufficient for consumption and accumulation
plans; and (e) agents’ expectations are realised ex post, (pet , w
e
t ) = (pt, wt).
For the sake of notational simplicity, because at a CE expectations are re-
alised and pt = pbt = p
e
t , we shall write the price vector as (pt, wt) ∈ 4×R+.
Several points should be noted about Definition 1. First, the concept
of CE is a temporary equilibrium notion which focuses on each period in
isolation. The dynamic evolution of the economy can thus be conceived
of as a sequence of temporary equilibria. Second, it focuses on non-trivial
allocations with a positive gross output vector, xt > 0. This is without loss
of generality because agents will optimally activate all sectors if the profit
rate is positive; and even if the profit rate is zero, xt > 0 can always be the
product of optimal choices, consistent with such a CE.
Third, following Roemer [19, 20], we assume that agents have stationary
expectations, pet = p
b
t . Although there are infinitely many ways of predicting
end-of-period prices, we assume agents to adopt the simplest possible heuris-
tics and suppose that beginning-of-period commodity prices will also rule at
the end of the period. Thus, we are endowing agents with an extremely weak
form of rationality in expectation formation in line with a large literature on
bounded rationality and behavioural economics.
It is now possible to derive some preliminary results. First of all, it is
immediate to prove that for any (pt, wt) ∈ 4×R+, if ((Aνt , Lνt ); ξνt ;ωνt ) solves
MP νt then (A
ν
t , L
ν
t ) must yield the maximum profit rate. Formally,
(Aνt , L
ν
t ) ∈ arg max
(A,L)∈Pt
max
i=1,...,n
πit = pit − ptAi − wtLi
ptAi
,
where pit is the i-th entry of pt and Ai is the i-th column of A.15 For any
15The set argmax(A,L)∈Pt maxi=1,...,n πit is non-empty, as Bt is finite.
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(pt, wt) ∈ 4× R+, let the maximum profit rate associated with a technique
(A,L) ∈ Pt be πt(A,L) = maxi=1,...,n πit, and let πmaxt = max(A,L)∈Pt πt(A,L)
denote the maximum profit rate attainable with the existing techniques.16
In principle, in equilibrium there may be various optimal production tech-
niques. However, as they will all yield the same (maximum) rate of profit, in
what follows we assume without loss of generality that all agents who acti-
vate some production process opt for the same (At, Lt), and drop the agent’s
superscript from production techniques.
Next, by constraints (1)-(2), it immediately follows that, at a CE the
following equation holds for all ν ∈ Nt:
ptωνt = [pt − ptAt − wtLt]xνt + (wt − ptb) lνt + ptωνt−1, (6)
Then, Lemma 1 derives some properties of the optimal solution to MP νt .
17
Lemma 1: Let
¡
(pt, wt) , ((At, Lt) ; ξνt ;ωνt )ν∈Nt
¢
be a CE forE(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1).
For all ν ∈ Nt: if πmaxt > 0, then ptAtxνt = ptωνt−1 and if wt > ptb, then lνt = 1.
Lemma 2 proves that equilibrium prices are strictly positive and compe-
tition leads to the equalisation of sectoral profit rates in equilibrium.
Lemma 2: Let
¡
(pt, wt) , ((At, Lt) ; ξνt ;ωνt )ν∈Nt
¢
be a CE forE(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1).
Then πmaxt = 0, pt = (1 + πmaxt ) ptAt + wtLt, pt > 0, and wt = ptb.
Lastly, Theorem 1 derives some key properties of competitive equilibria.18
Theorem 1: Let
¡
(pt, wt) , ((At, Lt) ; ξνt ;ωνt )ν∈Nt
¢
be a CE forE(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1).
(i) If πmaxt > 0 and wt > ptb, then Nt = lt = LtA−1t ωt−1.
(ii) If Nt > LtA−1t ωt−1, then wt = ptb;
(iii) If Nt < LtA−1t ωt−1, then πmaxt = 0.
16It is immediate to show that for all (pt, wt) ∈ 4 × R+ such that wt 5 ptb, 1 > vtb
implies πt(At, Lt) > 0 and, a fortiori, πmaxt > 0.
17The results in this section follow rather straightforwardly from MP νt and Definition 1
and their proofs are therefore omitted. (See the Addendum.)
18Theorem 1 only provides necessary conditions for the existence of a CE: this is all we
need in the analysis of technical change in the next sections. A complete characterisation
of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium is provided in
the Addendum.
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Finally, given an economy E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1) with aggregate capital stock
ωt−1 ∈ Rn+\ {0}, we define the set of feasible production techniques (A,L)
such that, given ωt−1, all agents can reach subsistence b:
Bt (ωt−1; b) ≡ ©(A,L) ∈ Bt | ∃A−1 s.t. A−1ωt−1 > 0 and (I − bL)A−1ωt−1 = 0ª .
In other words, if (A,L) ∈ Bt (ωt−1; b) is adopted, then there exists a profile
of actions (xνt ; l
ν
t ; δνt ;ωνt )ν∈Nt satisfying Definitions 1(b)-(d).
4 Technical progress and technical change
We are interested in the effects of technical progress on distribution. When
do innovations induce changes in production methods? More precisely, in the
context of our model: when does the appearance of a new technique force
a change in the equilibrium of the economy over time? How do innovations
alter the equilibrium distribution of income between profits and wages?
Recall that within every given period t the production set Bt, population
Nt, and aggregate capital stocks ωt−1 are constant, and they are given in the
determination of equilibrium prices and actions in t.19 Demographic changes,
accumulation, and technical innovations may, however, occur after the end of
period t, potentially leading to a new equilibrium, with different prices and
different production methods adopted.
Suppose, for example, that at t− 1 there was an excess supply of labour
pushing the wage down to the subsistence level and leading to the adoption
of a certain technique of production (Theorem 1(ii)). Given the high profits,
this may lead to overaccumulation such that in period t a new equilibrium
emerges in which the economy is labour constrained, wages increase, and
producers adopt a different production technique (Theorem 1(iii)).
In this paper, we abstract from changes in equilibrium prices and actions
induced by accumulation or demographic factors, and focus on inter-period
changes of technique from (At−1, Lt−1), which is chosen in period t − 1, to
another technique available in Bt due to technical progress, and their effect
on the equilibrium distribution of income.
In order to abstract from other factors, and analyse the equilibrium ef-
fects of inter-period change of technique due to technical progress, we shall
19This reflects the fact that the production of commodities — including capital stocks —
takes time and the assumption of a closed economy with no external source of labour.
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consider a subset of equilibria such that, absent any innovation, equilibrium
prices would be invariant across two periods. Formally:
Definition 2: Let
³
(pt−1, wt−1) ,
¡
(At−1, Lt−1) ; ξνt−1;ωνt−1
¢
ν∈Nt−1
´
be a CE
for E(Nt−1;Bt−1; b;Ωt−2). Then, the CE is persistent if and only if there
exists a profile of individual actions in period t, (ξνt ;ωνt )ν∈Nt, such that¡
(pt−1, wt−1) , ((At−1, Lt−1) ; ξνt ;ωνt )ν∈Nt
¢
is a CE for E(Nt;Bt−1; b;Ωt−1) with
ωt−1 =Pν∈Nt−1 ωνt−1.
In other words, if a CE for the period t−1 economy is persistent, then nei-
ther equilibrium prices (pt−1, wt−1) nor the production technique (At−1, Lt−1)
need to vary in period t, as long as no technical progress takes place between
the two periods. Therefore, the notion of persistent CE is primarily an an-
alytical device to examine the effect of technical progress in isolation, and
it describes a potentially counterfactual allocation that would emerge at t if
the economy had the same production set as at t− 1, Bt = Bt−1.
Absent technical progress, the conditions for the persistence of a CE are
not particularly strong, as they basically require capital accumulation to
appropriately adjust to changes in demographic conditions. Formally:20
Proposition 1: Let
³
(pt−1, wt−1) ,
¡
(At−1, Lt−1) ; ξνt−1;ωνt−1
¢
ν∈Nt−1
´
be a CE
for E(Nt−1;Bt−1; b;Ωt−2). Then, given Nt = {1, . . . , Nt},
(i) if πmaxt−1 > 0 and wt−1 > pt−1b, then this CE is persistent if and only if
A−1t−1ωt−1 > 0 and Nt = Lt−1A−1t−1ωt−1;
(ii) if πmaxt−1 > 0 and wt−1 = pt−1b, then this CE is persistent if and only if
A−1t−1ωt−1 > 0 and Nt = Lt−1A−1t−1ωt−1;
(iii) if πmaxt−1 = 0 and wt−1 > pt−1b, then this CE is persistent if and only if
there exists δ = 0 such thatA−1t−1 (ωt−1 − δ) > 0 andNt = Lt−1A−1t−1 (ωt−1 − δ).
The concept of CE allows us to analyse the emergence of what may be
thought of as Schumpeterian innovations: new techniques that create unfore-
seen profit opportunities, disrupt existing production processes, and cause
fundamental shifts in the distribution of income. To see this, suppose that
the economy is at a persistent CE in period t − 1 and technical progress
20The conditions in Proposition 1 would be satisfied if, for example, the economy was
on a balanced growth path with a given (At−1, Lt−1) and the growth rate of capital was
equal to the growth rate of population.
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occurs after production has taken place in t−1, but before productive inputs
are bought and production starts in period t. Under what conditions will
the emergence of an innovation (A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt\Bt−1 alter incentives and lead
agents to deviate from the persistent CE?
Clearly, if πt−1 (A∗, L∗) 5 πmaxt−1 = πt−1 (At−1, Lt−1) holds, then (pt−1, wt−1)
and (At−1, Lt−1) would still constitute a CE in period t. This motivates our
focus on innovations that are profitable in the following sense:
Definition 3: Let
³
(pt−1, wt−1) ,
¡
(A,L) ; ξνt−1; ωνt−1
¢
ν∈Nt
´
be a persistent
CE for E(Nt−1;Bt−1; b;Ωt−2). Let (A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt\Bt−1 be a new technique.
Inter-period change of technique from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗) is profitable if and
only if the following condition holds:¡
1 + πmaxt−1
¢
pt−1A
∗ + wt−1L
∗ ≤
¡
1 + πmaxt−1
¢
pt−1A+ wt−1L.
In other words, a new technique is profitable if at prices (pt−1, wt−1), a pro-
ducer can expect extra profits by switching from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗). Thus,
Definition 3 characterises a necessary condition for the persistent CE to dis-
appear: if the change from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗) is profitable, then capitalists
will never adopt (A,L) at (pt−1, wt−1).
Three points are worth noting about Definition 3. First, the premise that
the economy is at a persistent CE in period t− 1 is crucial. If the CE were
not persistent, then Definition 3 would not capture a relevant condition for
innovation to disrupt behaviour, as the economy may move to a different
equilibrium because of demographic factors and/or due to capital accumula-
tion. Similarly, the fact that the new technique would have been profitable
at last period’s prices would be immaterial for today’s decisions.
Second, and most important for our analysis, Definition 3 per se does
not tell us anything, a priori, about the effect of technical progress on dis-
tribution and profits. For, on the one hand, the condition in Definition 3 is
not sufficient to guarantee that the new production technique will indeed be
adopted in equilibrium. If it is profitable to switch from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗),
then the old technique will be abandoned, but this in turn means that equi-
librium prices will not, in general, remain the same. After the change in
prices, nothing guarantees that (A∗, L∗) will yield the highest profit rate in
Pt, and therefore, it will not necessarily be used at the new CE.21
21We shall return to this issue below in more detail.
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On the other hand, even if the new technique (A∗, L∗) is indeed optimal
at the new equilibrium prices (p∗t , w
∗
t ) in period t, and therefore yields the
highest profit rate, π∗maxt , among all techniques in Pt, π∗maxt may be higher
or lower than the profit rate πmaxt−1 associated with the old technique at the
equilibrium prices in t−1. Therefore it is unclear whether technical progress
has a positive effect on profitability, as Schumpeter suggested, or rather it
drives the tendency of equilibrium profit rates to fall, as Marx argued.
In his seminal contribution, Okishio [14] has shown that if the wage rate
is fixed at the subsistence level, then the equilibrium profit rate always in-
creases, thus casting doubts on the law of the falling rate of profit. Theorem
2 extends the Okishio Theorem (OT) by assuming that wages are paid ex
post and by allowing the wage rate to be higher than the subsistence level.
Theorem 2: Let
³
(pt−1, wt−1) ,
¡
(A,L) ; ξνt−1;ωνt−1
¢
ν∈Nt−1
´
be a persistent
CE for E(Nt−1;Bt−1; b;Ωt−2). Let (A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt\Bt−1 be a new technique
such that inter-period change of technique from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗) is prof-
itable. If
¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξνt ;ωνt )ν∈Nt
¢
is a CE for E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1) with
w∗t = wt−1, then π∗maxt > πmaxt−1 .
Proof: By Lemma 2, pt−1 =
¡
1 + πmaxt−1
¢
pt−1A+wt−1L and p∗t = (1 + π∗maxt ) p∗tA∗+
wt−1L
∗. Since the change of technique is profitable, pt−1 ≥
¡
1 + πmaxt−1
¢
pt−1A
∗+
wt−1L
∗ holds. Then, we have
pt−1 = wt−1L
£
I −
¡
1 + πmaxt−1
¢
A
¤−1 ≥ wt−1L∗ £I − ¡1 + πmaxt−1 ¢A∗¤−1 . (7)
where
£
I −
¡
1 + πmaxt−1
¢
A∗
¤−1
> 0. Post-multiplying both sides of equation
(7) by b > 0 and recalling that pt−1 ∈ ∆, we obtain
1 = wt−1L
£
I −
¡
1 + πmaxt−1
¢
A
¤−1
b > wt−1L
∗ £I − ¡1 + πmaxt−1 ¢A∗¤−1 b.
Since p∗t = w
∗
tL
∗ [I − (1 + π∗maxt )A∗]−1, w∗t = wt−1, and p∗t ∈ ∆, we also have
1 = wt−1L
∗ [I − (1 + π∗maxt )A∗]−1 b > wt−1L∗
£
I −
¡
1 + πmaxt−1
¢
A∗
¤−1
b.
The result then follows noting that L∗ [I − (1 + π)A∗]−1 is increasing in π.
Theorem 2 is far from obvious. As Roemer ([17], p.409) put it: “Clearly
if a capitalist introduces a cost-reducing technical change his short-run rate
of profit rises. This, however, produces a disequilibrium; what the theorem
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says is that after prices have readjusted to equilibrate the rate of profit again,
the new rate of profit will be higher than the old rate.” Theorem 2 is actu-
ally more general than standard versions of OT in that we adopt a general
equilibrium concept which implies, but does not reduce to, the equalisation
of sectoral profit rates.
5 Technical progress and equilibrium profits
One of the main advantages of the capitalist economic system, according to
both Marx and Schumpeter, is that profit-seeking behaviour and capitalist
competition induce permanent technical innovations, which in turn result in a
steady improvement in human welfare thanks to labor productivity increases.
Is this claim true in general? Is it possible to prove that any cost-reducing
technical change is actually progressive? In order to examine this issue, we
follow Roemer [17] and define two types of technical changes that are relevant
to understand innovation in capitalist economies.22
Definition 4: Let
³
(pt−1, wt−1) ,
¡
(A,L) ; ξνt−1; ωνt−1
¢
ν∈Nt−1
´
be a persistent
CE for E(Nt−1;Bt−1; b;Ωt−2). Let (A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt\Bt−1 be a new technique.
Inter-period change of technique from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗) is:
(i) capital-using and labour-saving (CU-LS) if and only ifA∗ ≥ A and L∗ ≤ L,
and there exists at least one sector i such that A∗i ≥ Ai and L∗i < Li;
(ii) capital-saving and labour-using (CS-LU) if and only if A∗ ≤ A and L∗ ≥
L, and there exists at least one sector i such that A∗i ≤ Ai and L∗i > Li.
Two features of Definition 4 are worth stressing. First, different types of
inter-period change of technique are defined in physical, rather thanmonetary
terms in order to abstract from the general equilibrium effects of technical
change on prices. Second, only technical changes that are weakly monotonic
in all produced inputs are considered. Although this may seem restrictive in
an n-good space, it is in line with the definitions used in the literature (and
in policy debates), and with intuitive notions of the mechanisation process
that has characterised much of capitalist development.
The next Definition classifies different types of changes of technique based
on their effect on labour multipliers and on labour productivity.
22See also Flaschel et al. [6] and Yoshihara and Veneziani [27].
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Definition 5: Let
³
(pt−1, wt−1) ,
¡
(A,L) ; ξνt−1;ωνt−1
¢
ν∈Nt−1
´
be a persistent
CE for E(Nt−1,Nt;Bt−1; b;Ωt−2). Let (A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt\Bt−1 be a new technique.
Inter-period change of technique from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗) is:
(a) progressive if and only if v∗ < v;
(b) neutral if and only if v∗ = v;
(c) regressive if and only if v∗ > v.
In other words, the adoption of a new technique is progressive if it leads to
a uniform decrease in employment multipliers, and therefore to an increase in
labour productivity. Regressive technical changes have the opposite effect.23
Given Definitions 4 and 5, we can derive a generalisation of some standard
results in the literature.24
Proposition 2 (Roemer [17]): Let
³
(pt−1, wt−1) ,
¡
(A,L) ; ξνt−1; ωνt−1
¢
ν∈Nt−1
´
be a persistent CE for E(Nt−1;Bt−1; b;Ωt−2). Let (A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt\Bt−1 be a
new technique. Suppose that inter-period change of technique from (A,L)
to (A∗, L∗) is profitable. Then, (i) if it is CU-LS, then it is progressive; while
(ii) if it is CS-LU with v (A−A∗) ≤ (L∗ − L), then it is regressive.
Proposition 2 states that not all forms of ‘creative destruction’ have unam-
biguously beneficial effects. While cost-reducing innovations that substitute
capital for labour expand the economy’s production possibility frontier, other
types of profitable technical change may be incompatible with the improve-
ment of human welfare in terms of a decrease in toil and effort.
Although Proposition 2 provides some insights on the welfare effects of
technical progress, it only tells part of the story, because it does not say
anything about its distributive effects. In the rest of this section, we start
to address this issue by characterising equilibria in which innovations are
adopted. In order to derive the next results, we impose more structure on
technical progress and focus on technical changes whose main effect is on
labour, rather than on capital inputs. Formally:
Definition 6: Let inter-period change of technique from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗)
23Definition 5 focuses on changes of technique that modify all employment multipliers
in the same direction. As Roemer ([17], p.410) notes, this is without any loss of generality
if one considers changes of technique of the type described in Definition 4.
24The proof of Proposition 2 is a straightforward extension of the proof of Theorems 1-2
in Flaschel et al [6] and is therefore omitted. (See Addendum.)
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take place in sector i such that Ai 6= A∗i . Then, the change of technique is
labour inelastic if and only if |Li − L∗i | > |LA−1 (Ai −A∗i )|.
Definition 6 identifies innovations whose main effect is on labour, rather
than produced inputs. The intuition is straightforward in a one-good econ-
omy: an inter-period change of technique is labour inelastic if the percentage
change in produced input is smaller than the percentage change in labour
input. In an n-good economy, (Ai −A∗i ) is the change in the vector of com-
modity inputs necessary to produce one unit of good i. Definition 6 uses the
linear operator LA−1 to transform the units of physical goods into labour:
LA−1 (Ai −A∗i ) represents the amount of direct labour demand necessary for
the operation of the variational commodity inputs. Then, Definition 6 states
that a change of technique is labour inelastic if and only if the change in
the profile of commodity inputs measured in labour units is smaller than the
change of direct labour input necessary to produce one unit of good i.
We can now derive the following result:
Theorem 3: Let
³
(pt−1, wt−1) ,
¡
(A,L) ; ξνt−1; ωνt−1
¢
ν∈Nt−1
´
be a persistent
CE with πmaxt−1 > 0 and wt−1 > pt−1b for E(Nt−1;Bt−1; b;Ωt−2). Let (A∗, L∗) ∈
Bt\Bt−1 be a new technique, and let inter-period change of technique from
(A,L) to (A∗, L∗) be profitable and labour inelastic. Then:
(i) if the change of technique is CU-LS and it results in a CE
¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
for E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1), then w∗t = p∗t b and π∗maxt > πmaxt−1 whenever A∗x∗t =ωt−1; otherwise, π∗maxt = 0;
(ii) if the change of technique is CS-LU and it results in a CE
¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
for E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1), then π∗maxt = 0 < πmaxt−1 ;
(iii) if the change of technique is CS-LU and regressive, then there is no CE
in t in which (A∗, L∗) is adopted.
Proof: As
³
(pt−1, wt−1) ,
¡
(A,L) ; ξνt−1;ωνt−1
¢
ν∈Nt−1
´
is a persistent CE with
πmaxt−1 > 0 and wt−1 > pt−1b, Proposition 1 implies that Nt = LA−1ωt−1, and
there exist (ξνt )ν∈Nt = (xνt ; 1;0)ν∈Nt and (ωνt )ν∈Nt such that xt > 0 withAxt =ωt−1, and ¡(pt−1, wt−1) , ((A,L) ; ξνt ; ωνt )ν∈Nt¢ is a CE for E(Nt;Bt−1; b;Ωt−1).
Part (i). For (A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt\Bt−1, let there be no x0 ∈ Rn+ such that A∗x0 =ωt−1 holds. As ¡(p∗t , w∗t ) , ((A∗, L∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt¢ is a CE forE(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1),
there exists an aggregate production activity vector x∗t ∈ Rn+ such that
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A∗x∗t ≤ ωt−1 holds. In this case, as p∗t > 0 by Lemma 2, we have p∗tA∗x∗t <
p∗tωt−1. Then, by Lemma 1, π∗maxt = 0 holds.
Let the change of technique from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗) take place, and let¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
be a CE for E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1) in which
there exists an aggregate production activity vector x∗t ∈ Rn+ such that
A∗x∗t = ωt−1 holds. Because this change of technique is CU-LS, A∗xt ≥
Axt = ωt−1 and L∗xt < Lxt = Nt. Therefore, since A∗x∗t = ωt−1, we obtain
A∗ (xt − x∗t ) ≥ 0. We consider two cases.
Case 1: 0 < x∗t 5 xt.
Clearly, L∗x∗t < Lxt = Nt, so that w
∗
t = p
∗
t b follows from Lemma 1 and
Definition 1(c).
Let π0 ∈ [0,Π (A∗)) be such that ρ (π0) ≡ wt−1L∗ [I − (1 + π0)A∗]−1 b = 1.
To see that such π0 exists, observe that limπ0→Π(A∗)ρ (π0) =∞, while ρ (0) =
wt−1v
∗b and 1 = pt−1b = wt−1vb > wt−1v∗b holds, where the latter inequality
follows from Proposition 2(i). Therefore, as ρ (π0) is a continuous function,
the existence of π0 ∈ [0,Π (A∗)) follows from the intermediate value theorem.
Then, setting p0 ≡ wt−1L∗ [I − (1 + π0)A∗]−1, we have (p0, wt−1) ∈ 4 ×
R+ with p0 = (1 + π0) p0A∗ + wt−1L∗ > 0. Using the same argument as in
the proof of Theorem 2, it can be proved that π0 > πmaxt−1 . However, since
p∗t = (1 + π∗maxt ) p∗tA∗+w∗tL∗ and w∗t = p∗t b < wt−1, π∗maxt > π0 holds, which
implies π∗maxt > πmaxt−1 .
Case 2: x∗t £ xt.
We only need to show L∗x∗t < Lxt, for then the argument for case 1 can
be used to conclude the proof of part (i). Suppose, by way of contradiction,
that L∗x∗t = Lxt = Nt. By Definition 1(c), this implies L∗x∗t = Nt. Then, as
A∗x∗t = ωt−1,
LA−1A∗x∗t = Lxt = Nt by Axt = ωt−1
⇔ LA−1 (A+4A)x∗t = Nt where 4A ≡ (A∗ −A)
⇔ Lx∗t + LA−14Ax∗t = Nt
⇒ L∗x∗t + LA−14Ax∗t < Nt by L∗ ≤ L and x∗t > 0.
As L∗x∗t = Nt, the last inequality implies LA
−14Ax∗t = LA−1 (A∗ −A) x∗t <
0. Because technical change is labour inelastic, it follows that (L∗ − L)x∗t <
LA−1 (A∗ −A)x∗t = LA−1A∗x∗t−Lx∗t , which implies L∗x∗t < LA−1A∗x∗t . The
desired contradiction then follows noting that L∗x∗t = Nt and by LA
−1A∗x∗t =
Nt. Therefore we conclude that L∗x∗t < Lxt holds, as sought.
19
Part (ii). Let the change of technique from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗) be prof-
itable and CS-LU, and let
¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
be a CE for
E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1). Suppose, ad absurdum, that π∗maxt > 0. By Lemma 1, at
the optimal solution ξ∗νt it must be δ∗νt = 0 and p∗tA∗x∗νt = p∗tωνt−1, for allν ∈ Nt. Since p∗t > 0, then by Definition 1(b), A∗x∗t = ωt−1 = Axt. Hence
Lxt = LA
−1ωt−1 = Nt and ωt−1 = A∗x∗t imply LA−1A∗x∗t = Nt. Therefore
Lx∗t + LA
−14Ax∗t = Nt where 4A ≡ (A∗ −A)
⇒ L∗x∗t + LA−14Ax∗t > Nt by L∗ ≥ L and x∗t > 0,
⇒ Lxt + LA−14Ax∗t > Nt by L∗x∗t 5 Lxt = Nt.
As Lxt = Nt, the last inequality implies LA−14Ax∗t = LA−1 (A∗ −A)x∗t > 0.
Because technical change is labour inelastic, (L∗ − L)x∗t > LA−1 (A∗ −A)x∗t =
Nt − Lx∗t , which implies L∗x∗t > Nt = Lxt, a contradiction.
Part (iii). Suppose, contrary to the statement, that
¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
is a CE forE(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1). Then, by the proof of Part (ii), π∗maxt = 0 holds.
Thus, (p∗t , w
∗
t ) =
¡
v∗
v∗b ,
1
v∗b
¢
holds. As (A∗, L∗) is optimal at prices (p∗t , w
∗
t ), it
follows that v∗ 5 v∗A+L. Thus, v∗ 5 v holds. This contradicts the fact that
technical change is regressive. Therefore, the new technique (A∗, L∗) cannot
be optimally chosen in a CE for E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1).
A key assumption in Theorem 3 is that the CE in period t− 1 is charac-
terised by the full employment of labour (wt−1 > pt−1b) and capital (πmaxt−1 >
0), and that it is persistent. This implies that aggregate capital stocks ac-
cumulated in t − 1 would be sufficient to guarantee the full employment of
labour at t at the same price vector (pt−1, wt−1) and using the same produc-
tion technique (A,L), if no new technique emerged and Bt = Bt−1.
Suppose, however, that a new technique (A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt\Bt−1 does appear,
possibly as the product of successful R&D, right after period t − 1. If the
change from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗) is profitable and CU-LS, then Theorem 3(i)
shows that if the new technique is adopted in equilibrium, then it leads the
profit rate to increase and the wage rate to fall to the subsistence level, due
to the emergence of an excess supply of labour and unemployment.25
If technical change is profitable and CS-LU, then the effect on factor
income distribution is less clear-cut. If the new technique is adopted in
25This is the Marxian “industrial reserve army of the unemployed”. Together, Theorem
1, Proposition 1, and Theorem 3 may be interpreted as illustrating Marx’s [12] general
law of capitalist accumulation.
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equilibrium, then the equilibrium profit rate falls to zero, as the shift to the
new technique makes aggregate capital abundant relative to the labour force
(Theorem 3(ii)). If, however, the CS-LU change of technique is regressive,
then the dynamic transition from the CE at t− 1 does not lead the economy
to a new equilibrium associated with this new technique at t (Theorem 3(iii)).
Next, Theorem 4 characterises equilibria with a new technique when the
aggregate capital stock at t is not sufficient to allow for the full employment
of labour using the old production technique (Nt > LA−1ωt−1):
Theorem 4: Let
³
(pt−1, wt−1) ,
¡
(A,L) ; ξνt−1;ωνt−1
¢
ν∈Nt−1
´
be a persistent
CE with Axt−1 = ωt−2 and Lxt−1 < Nt−1 for E(Nt−1;Bt−1; b;Ωt−2). Let
(A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt\Bt−1 be a new technique, and inter-period change of tech-
nique from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗) be profitable. Suppose it results in a CE¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
for E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1). If the change of
technique is (i) CU-LS and labour inelastic, then w∗t = p
∗
t b and π∗maxt > πmaxt−1
whenever A∗x∗t = ωt−1; otherwise, π∗maxt = 0. If it is (ii) CS-LU with suffi-
ciently small (A−A∗, L∗ − L), then w∗t = p∗t b and π∗maxt > πmaxt−1 .
Proof: As the CE in period t − 1 is persistent, Proposition 1 implies that
Nt = LA−1ωt−1, and there exist ξνt = (xνt ; 1;0)ν∈Nt and (ωνt )ν∈Nt such that
xt > 0 with Axt = ωt−1 and ¡(pt−1, wt−1) , ((A,L) ; ξνt ;ωνt )ν∈Nt¢ is a CE for
E(Nt;Bt−1; b;Ωt−1).
Part (i). Consider a CU-LS and labour inelastic change of technique that
is adopted at a CE
¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
for E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1).
Suppose, first, that A∗x∗ = ωt−1. Then, using an argument similar to that
used in the proof of Theorem 3(i):
Lx∗t + LA
−14Ax∗t = Lxt where 4A ≡ (A∗ −A)
⇒ L∗x∗t + LA−14Ax∗t < Lxt by L∗ ≤ L and x∗t > 0.
Suppose L∗x∗t = Lxt. Then, the above inequalities imply LA−14Ax∗t < 0,
and since technical change is labour inelastic, it follows that (L∗ − L)x∗t <
LA−14Ax∗t < 0. As LA−14Ax∗t = Lxt − Lx∗t , (L∗ − L) x∗t < Lxt − Lx∗t
implies that L∗x∗t < Lxt, yielding the desired contradiction. Thus, L
∗x∗t <
Lxt 5 Nt. Therefore, Theorem 1(ii) implies w∗t = p∗t b, which in turn impliesπ∗maxt > πmaxt−1 by Theorem 2.
Suppose, next, that A∗x∗t ≤ ωt−1 = Axt. Then, as p∗t > 0 by Lemma 2,
we have p∗tA
∗x∗t < p
∗
tωt−1, and so π∗maxt = 0 holds by Lemma 1.
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Part (ii). Since (A−A∗, L∗ − L) is sufficiently small, L∗A∗−1ωt−1 is suffi-
ciently close to LA−1ωt−1, which implies that Nt > L∗A∗−1ωt−1 holds. Then,
w∗t = p
∗
t b follows from Theorem 1(ii), and by Theorem 2, π∗maxt > πmaxt−1 .
Theorems 3 and 4 provide a comprehensive analysis of the effects of inno-
vation on the equilibrium income distribution.26 More precisely, they char-
acterise the new factor income distribution between the capitalist class and
the working class, if the economy moves to a new equilibrium with the new
technique. Yet, they are silent on whether the different types of technical
change actually lead to a new equilibrium in which the new technique is
adopted. To this topic we turn next.
6 The transition to new equilibria
In this section, and the next, we analyse whether innovations lead to a new
equilibrium in which a new technique is adopted. In the standard literature
on OT (e.g. Okishio [14]; Roemer [17, 18, 19]; Franke [7]; Flaschel et al [6]),
a profitable new technique is assumed to be adopted, as it leads to disequi-
librium profits that are eventually competed away. In our framework, the
interaction of technical progress, labour market conditions and maximising
behaviour leads to a more complex, and arguably more realistic picture.
For each (A,L) ∈ Bt, let
F (π; (A,L)) =
½ 1
L[I−(1+π)A]−1b if π ∈ [0,Π (A)) ,
0 if π = Π (A) .
Let F−1 (·; (A,L)) be the inverse function of F (·; (A,L)), which is well-
defined since F (·; (A,L)) is strictly decreasing at every π ∈ [0,Π (A)].
The wage-profit curve associated with (A,L) can be defined as follows:
πw (A,L) ≡ ©(π, w) ∈ R2+ | w = F (π; (A,L)) for π ∈ [0,Π (A)]ª .
The wage-profit frontier associated with Bt is the envelope of the various
26In both theorems, we focus on persistent CEs such that at the beginning of t, if the
period t− 1 optimal technique (A,L) was adopted, then Nt = LA−1ωt−1 would hold. In
other words, we rule out dynamic paths that end up with an excess supply of capital. This
is theoretically reasonable, given our focus on the growth path of capitalist economies.
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wage-profit curves and can be defined as follows:
πw (Bt) ≡ ©(π, w) ∈ R2+ | ∃ (A,L) ∈ Bt : (π, w) ∈ πw (A,L)
& ∀ (A0, L0) ∈ Bt, ∀ (π0, w0) ∈ πw (A0, L0) : w0 = w⇒ π0 5 π} .
The concepts of wage-profit curve and wage-profit frontier provide the
analytical tools to examine optimal choice of technique and the interaction
between technical progress and distribution. For in equilibrium only tech-
niques that lie on πw (Bt) will be adopted. Formally:
Lemma 3: A technique (A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt with p∗ = (1 + π∗) p∗A∗ + w∗L∗ for
some (p∗, w∗) ∈ 4× R2+ minimises production costs at the rate of profit π∗
if and only if (π∗, w∗) ∈ πw (Bt)).
Proof: See Kurz and Salvadori ([10]; Theorem 5.1).
In other words, a technique (A∗, L∗) is adopted if no other technique in Bt
allows for a wage rate higher than w∗ for π = π∗.
For each (A,L), the intercepts of πw(A,L) on the vertical axis and on the
horizontal axis are, respectively, the points
¡
0, 1
vb
¢
and (Π (A) , 0). Therefore,
for any (A,L) , (A0, L0) ∈ Bt, if v > v0 and A ≤ A0, then
¡
0, 1
vb
¢
≤
¡
0, 1
v0b
¢
and
(Π (A) , 0) ≥ (Π (A0) , 0) and the wage-profit curves πw (A,L) ,πw (A0, L0)
intersect at least once, and quite possibly more than once, given the rather
complicated polynomial form of wage-profit curves.
Finally, given a wage-profit curve πw (A,L) and given (π, w) ∈ R2+, letπw (A,L; (π, w)) ≡ {(π0, w0) ∈ πw (A,L) | (π0, w0) ≥ (π, w)}.
6.1 Full employment
In the analysis of the interaction between technical progress and the equilib-
rium income distribution, it is natural to start from innovations which allow
for the full employment of all factors of production. Theorem 5 shows that
in this special case, the distributive effects of technical change are difficult
to predict and may not be Pareto-improving.
Theorem 5: Let
³
(pt−1, wt−1) ,
¡
(A,L) ; ξνt−1;ωνt−1
¢
ν∈Nt−1
´
be a persistent
CE for E(Nt−1;Bt−1; b;Ωt−2). Let (A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt (ωt−1, b) \Bt−1 be a new
technique with Nt = L∗A∗−1ωt−1. Let inter-period change of technique from
(A,L) to (A∗, L∗) be profitable. Then, there exists a non-empty πw ¡A∗, L∗; ¡πmaxt−1 , wt−1¢¢
23
such that for any (π0, w0) ∈ πw ¡A∗, L∗; ¡πmaxt−1 , wt−1¢¢, there exists a CE¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξνt ;ωνt )ν∈Nt
¢
forE(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1)withw∗t = w0 and π∗maxt =π0. Furthermore, if Nt = LA−1ωt−1, πmaxt−1 > 0, and wt−1 > pt−1b, then there
exist CEs with either π∗maxt < πmaxt−1 or w∗t < wt−1.
Proof:
Case 1. Let Nt = LA−1ωt−1.
1. Because
³
(pt−1, wt−1) ,
¡
(A,L) ; ξνt−1;ωνt−1
¢
ν∈Nt−1
´
is a persistent CE
for E(Nt−1;Bt−1; b;Ωt−2), (A,L) ∈ argmax(A0,L0)∈Pt−1 πt−1(A0, L0). Then, by
Lemma 3,
¡πmaxt−1 , wt−1¢ ∈ πw (Bt−1) with πmaxt−1 = πt−1(A,L). Moreover, since
the change from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗) is profitable at (pt−1, wt−1), by Proposition
5.1 in Kurz and Salvadori [10], there exists a technique (A∗∗, L∗∗) ∈ Pt such
that for some (p∗∗, w∗∗) ∈ 4×R+ with w∗∗ > wt−1, p∗∗ =
¡
1 + πmaxt−1
¢
p∗∗A∗∗+
w∗∗L∗∗.27 However, because (A,L) is the most profitable technique in Pt−1
at (pt−1, wt−1) and {(A∗, L∗)} = Bt\Bt−1, then (A∗∗, L∗∗) = (A∗, L∗) holds,
without loss of generality.
Clearly, (πt−1, w∗∗) ∈ πw (A∗, L∗) and (πt−1, w∗∗) ∈ πw (Bt) \πw (Bt−1).
Then, noting that πw (A∗, L∗) and πw (Bt−1) are both downward sloping,
it follows that there is a continuum of points (π∗, w∗) ∈ πw (A∗, L∗) with
(π∗, w∗) ≥ ¡πmaxt−1 , wt−1¢, and for any such point, (π∗, w∗) ∈ πw (Bt) holds.
Insert Figure 1 around here.
2. Consider any (π0, w0) ∈ πw (Bt) such that (π0, w0) ≥ ¡πmaxt−1 , wt−1¢. By
Lemma 3, there is a p∗ ∈ 4 such that p∗ = w0L∗ [I − (1 + π0)A∗]−1 > 0 and
(A∗, L∗) is optimal at (p∗, w0). Hence, since Nt = L∗A∗−1ωt−1 and (A∗, L∗) ∈
Bt (ωt−1, b), there exists a suitable assignment of capital stocks (ωνt )ν∈Nt
and production activities (ξνt )ν∈Nt = (xνt ; lνt ; δνt )ν∈Nt such that
P
ν∈Nt x
ν
t =
A∗−1ωt−1, p∗A∗xνt = p∗ωνt−1 for all ν ∈ Nt, and (lνt , δνt ) = (1,0) that solve
MP νt for all ν ∈ Nt. Then,
¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξνt ; ωνt )ν∈Nt
¢
is a CE for
E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1) with p∗t = p∗, w∗t = w0, and π∗maxt = π0.
3. If πmaxt−1 > 0, and wt−1 > pt−1b then the argument in step 1 can be
used to show that there exists a sufficiently small ε > 0 such that if, for some
(π∗, w∗) ∈ πw (A∗, L∗), either 0 < πmaxt−1 −π∗ < ε, or 0 < wt−1−w∗ < ε, then
(π∗, w∗) ∈ πw (Bt) still holds. The argument in step 2 can then be applied
to prove the existence of a CE.
27For a statement of Proposition 5.1 in Kurz and Salvadori [10] see the Addendum.
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Case 2. Let Nt < LA−1ωt−1.
By Proposition 1, at t−1 it must be πmaxt−1 = 0 and wt−1 = 1vb . However, by
applying the same reasoning as in Case 1, for any (π∗, w∗) ∈ πw (A∗, L∗) with
(π∗, w∗) ≥ ¡πmaxt−1 , wt−1¢, (π∗, w∗) ∈ πw (Bt) holds. Therefore, πw ¡A∗, L∗; ¡πmaxt−1 , wt−1¢¢ (πw (Bt) is non-empty. Moreover, asNt = L∗A∗−1ωt−1 holds, for any (π0, w0) ∈
πw ¡A∗, L∗; ¡πmaxt−1 , wt−1¢¢, there exists a CE ¡(p∗t , w∗t ) , ((A∗, L∗) ;xνt ; lνt ; δνt )ν∈Nt¢
for E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1) with w∗t = w0 and π∗maxt = π0.
Case 3. Let Nt > LA−1ωt−1.
By Proposition 1, at t− 1 it must be πmaxt−1 > 0 and wt−1 = pt−1b. Again,
by applying the same reasoning as in Case 1, πw ¡A∗, L∗; ¡πmaxt−1 , wt−1¢¢ (πw (Bt) is non-empty. Thus, for any (π0, w0) ∈ πw ¡A∗, L∗; ¡πmaxt−1 , wt−1¢¢,
there exists a CE
¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ;xνt ; l
ν
t ; δνt )ν∈Nt
¢
for E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1)
with w∗t = w
0 and π∗maxt = π0.
Theorem 5 suggests that when a profitable change of technique guaran-
tees the full employment of both labour and capital, then a new equilibrium
emerges at t in which the new technique is indeed adopted. The effect of
innovation on distribution is not clear a priori, however, because of the (infi-
nitely) many profit rates and wage rates that can be supported in equilibrium.
Interestingly, technical progress may even make either capitalists or workers
strictly worse off as there exist equilibria at t with either π∗maxt < πmaxt−1 or
w∗t < wt−1. The distributional outcome will depend on the actual equilibrium
selection mechanism.28 Yet, by Theorem 2, we know that if w∗t = wt−1, thenπ∗maxt > πmaxt−1 and so, absent a strong distributional shift towards labour,
technical change will tend to increase profitability.
6.2 Technological unemployment
Theorem 3(i) characterises the implications of profitable CU-LS technical
change on distribution if the new technique is adopted. It is not clear, how-
ever, whether the technological shift toward the new technique will indeed
take place in equilibrium: while the new technique is profitable at the equi-
librium prices ruling at t − 1, the very introduction of the new technique
is likely to cause disequilibrium in commodity markets and in the labour
market, which in turn would cause prices to change.
28One possible solution to this indeterminacy is to consider some form of bargaining
over distributive outcomes. See, e.g., Cogliano et al. [5] and Yoshihara and Kaneko [25].
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Theorem 6 derives the conditions under which profitable, CU-LS technical
change leads to a new CE in which the newly discovered technique is adopted:
Theorem 6: Let
³
(pt−1, wt−1) ,
¡
(A,L) ; ξνt−1;ωνt−1
¢
ν∈Nt−1
´
be a persistent
CEwith πmaxt−1 > 0 and sufficiently smallwt−1−pt−1b = 0 forE(Nt−1;Bt−1; b;Ωt−2).
Let (A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt (ωt−1, b) \Bt−1 be a new technique. If inter-period change
of technique from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗) is profitable, CU-LS, and labour in-
elastic, then it results in a new CE
¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
with
ξ∗νt = (x∗νt ; l∗νt ;0)ν∈Nt, w∗t = p∗t b, and π∗maxt > πmaxt−1 for E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1).
Proof: 1. Let
³
(pt−1, wt−1) ,
¡
(A,L) ; ξνt−1;ωνt−1
¢
ν∈Nt−1
´
be a persistent CE
with πmaxt−1 > 0 and sufficiently smallwt−1−pt−1b = 0 forE(Nt−1;Bt−1; b;Ωt−2).
Then, by Proposition 1, Nt = LA−1ωt−1. Let (A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt (ωt−1, b) \Bt−1 be
a new technique and let the change of technique from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗) be
profitable. Then, as in step 1 of the proof of Theorem 5, it follows that for
any (π∗, w∗) ∈ πw (A∗, L∗) with (π∗, w∗) ≥ ¡πmaxt−1 , wt−1¢, (π∗, w∗) ∈ πw (Bt).
2. Since both πw (Bt−1) and πw (A∗, L∗) are strictly downward sloping,
there exists a sufficiently small ² > 0 such that for any (π0, w0) ∈ πw (Bt−1)
with ² = wt−1 − w0 = 0, there exists w0∗ > wt−1 with (π0, w0∗) ∈ πw (A∗, L∗)
Then, as in step 1 of the proof of Theorem 5, it follows that for any (π∗, w∗) ∈
πw (A∗, L∗) with (π∗, w∗) ≥ (π0, w0), (π∗, w∗) ∈ πw (Bt). Thus, there exists
π0∗ > π0 such that (π0∗, w0) ∈ πw (A∗, L∗)∩ πw (Bt), and, by Lemma 3, there
is a price vector p0 ∈ 4 such that p0 = w0L∗ [I − (1 + π0∗)A∗]−1 > 0 and
(A∗, L∗) is optimal with respect to (p0, w0). If ² = wt−1 − pt−1b = 0, then we
can set w0 = 1 = pt−1b, and (A∗, L∗) is optimal at (p∗t , w
∗
t ) with w
∗
t = p
∗
t b = 1
and w∗tL
∗ = p∗t [I − (1 + π∗maxt )A∗].
3. Since (A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt (ωt−1, b), x∗t ≡ A∗−1ωt−1 > 0. Then the argu-
ment used in the proof of Theorem 3(i) for the case with A∗x∗t = ωt−1 can
be used to prove that Nt = LA−1ωt−1 > L∗A∗−1ωt−1. Since (A∗, L∗) ∈
Bt (ωt−1, b), (I − bL∗)A∗−1ωt−1 = 0 holds, so that for x∗t ≡ A∗−1ωt−1, we
have x∗t = bLx
∗
t + ωt with ωt ≡ x∗t − bLx∗t = 0. Then, there exists a
suitable assignment of capital stocks (ω∗νt )ν∈Nt and production activities
(ξ∗νt )ν∈Nt = (x∗νt ; l∗νt ;0)ν∈Nt such that
P
ν∈Nt x
∗ν
t = x
∗
t , p
∗
tA
∗x∗νt = p
∗
tωνt−1,
and (l∗νt , δ∗νt ) ∈ [0, 1]× {0} for all ν ∈ Nt such that Pν∈Nt l∗νt = L∗x∗t < Nt.
Thus,
¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
is a CE with w∗t = p
∗
t b = 1 for
E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1). Finally, as πw (Bt−1) and πw (A∗, L∗) are downward slop-
ing, we can see that π∗maxt > πmaxt−1 holds.
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Theorem 6 shows that a profitable, CU-LS innovation may indeed be
adopted in equilibrium at t, provided wt−1 is sufficiently low. If this is not
the case, however, the new technique may not be adopted. To see this, sup-
pose that change of technique from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗) is CU-LS, labour in-
elastic, and profitable at (pt−1, wt−1), and Nt = LA−1ωt−1 holds. Then, Nt >
L∗A∗−1ωt−1, as per the proof of Theorem 3(i). Thus, if ¡(p∗t , w∗t ) , ((A∗, L∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt¢
is a CE, then it must be w∗t = p
∗
t b = 1 by Theorem 1(ii).
Insert Figure 2 around here.
Yet, while (A∗, L∗) yields higher profits than (A,L) in a neighbourhood of
(pt−1, wt−1), it does not necessarily maximise the profit rate at (p∗t , w
∗
t ) if
w∗t = 1 is much lower than wt−1. In this case, it is possible for (A,L) to be
optimal at (p∗t , w
∗
t ), and there may be a CE with prices (p
∗
t , w
∗
t ) and actions
((A,L) ; (xνt ; 1;0) ;ωνt )ν∈Nt withAxt = ωt−1. Figure 3 describes this situation.
Insert Figure 3 around here.
The above argument can be summarised by the following corollary:
Corollary 2: Let
³
(pt−1, wt−1) ,
¡
(A,L) ; ξνt−1;ωνt−1
¢
ν∈Nt−1
´
be a persistent
CE with πmaxt−1 > 0 for E(Nt−1;Bt−1; b;Ωt−2). Let (A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt (ωt−1, b) \Bt−1
be a new technique. Let inter-period change of technique from (A,L) to
(A∗, L∗) be profitable, CU-LS, and labour inelastic. Then, there exists a CE¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
forE(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1) if and only if (π∗maxt , w∗t = 1) ∈πw (Bt) ∩ πw (A∗, L∗).
Corollary 2 characterises the conditions under which what may be deemed
a market failure occurs: if the condition in Corollary 2 is violated, there exists
no equilibrium in which a new technique is adopted in equilibrium even if it
is profitable and increases labour productivity.
Indeed, in this case innovations may cause an even deeper failure and
disrupt the functioning of capitalist economies in a more surprising and
counterintuitive way: technical progress may cause the economy to reach no
equilibrium at t. To see this, reconsider the previous example and suppose
that there is another technique (A∗∗, L∗∗) ∈ Bt−1\Bt−1 (ωt−1, b) such that
v∗∗ > v. Thus, Bt = {(A,L) , (A∗, L∗) , (A∗∗, L∗∗)}. Suppose further that
(A∗∗, L∗∗) is uniquely optimal at prices p∗t = w
∗
tL
∗ [I − (1 + π∗maxt )A∗]−1 and
w∗t = p
∗
t b = 1, and that πw (A,L) is not on the envelope πw (Bt). Then,
there may exist no CE in the economy.
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To see this, note, first, that as πw (A,L) is not on the envelope πw (Bt),
(A,L) will never be activated in equilibrium. Next, we rule out the possibility
that agents activate convex combinations of the other two techniques. Let
μ ∈ [0, 1] be the weight assigned to activity (A∗, L∗) in such combinations.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that μ = 1 and only (A∗, L∗) is
activated in equilibrium. Then, by Theorem 1(ii), the corresponding equilib-
rium prices would be (p∗t , w
∗
t ). However, as (A
∗∗, L∗∗) is optimal at (p∗t , w
∗
t ),
(A∗, L∗) would not be chosen in equilibrium.
Next, suppose that μ = 0 and only (A∗∗, L∗∗) is adopted in equilibrium.
Because (A∗∗, L∗∗) ∈ Bt−1\Bt−1 (ωt−1, b), there is no x0 > 0 such that A∗∗x0 =
ωt−1.29 Hence, by Lemmas 1 and 2 the equilibrium price vector must be
p∗∗t =
1
v∗∗bv
∗∗ and w∗∗t =
1
v∗∗b . Yet, because
1
v∗∗b <
1
vb
< 1
v∗b by v
∗∗ > v
and Proposition 2(i), (A∗, L∗) yields a higher profit rate than (A∗∗, L∗∗) at
(p∗∗t , w
∗∗
t ). Thus, (A
∗∗, L∗∗) cannot be optimally chosen in equilibrium.
Finally, suppose that in equilibrium agents activate both production tech-
niques with weight μ ∈ (0, 1). This implies that the equilibrium price vector
(p0, w0) with p0 = w0[I−(1 + π0)A−1] corresponds to a point (π0, w0) on the en-
velope πw (Bt) where the wage curves πw (A∗, L∗) and πw (A∗∗, L∗∗) intersect.
By construction, (π0, w0) > (0, 1). Therefore, by Lemma 1 in equilibrium
μL∗A∗−1ωt−1 + (1− μ)L∗∗A∗∗−1ωt−1 = Nt must hold. As L∗A∗−1ωt−1 < Nt,
it follows that L∗∗A∗∗−1ωt−1 > Nt and there exists a unique μ ∈ (0, 1) such
the labour market is in equilibrium.
Because (A∗∗, L∗∗) ∈ Bt−1\Bt−1 (ωt−1, b), either A∗∗−1ωt−1 ≯ 0 or (I −
bL)A∗∗−1ωt−1 ¸ 0 holds. But then, there exist a range of values of μ ∈
(0, 1) such that either μA∗−1ωt−1 + (1− μ)A∗∗−1ωt−1 ≯ 0 or μA∗−1ωt−1 +
(1− μ)A∗∗−1ωt−1 ¸ Ntb. In either case, if the unique μ ∈ (0, 1) that clears
the labour market falls within the relevant range, Definition 1(d) is violated.
As a result, the economy with Bt = {(A,L) , (A∗, L∗) , (A∗∗, L∗∗)} may
not arrive at any equilibrium. Figure 4 describes such a situation.
Insert Figure 4 around here.
29The case with x∗∗ ¸ bL∗∗x∗∗ for x∗∗ ≡ A∗∗−1ωt−1 > 0 can be ignored as it violates
Definition 1(d) and therefore cannot be part of an equilibrium.
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7 The falling rate of profit
In the previous section, we have shown that — once the general equilibrium
effects of technical change are taken into account — the distributive effects of
innovations are not obvious. Absent a significant shift in bargaining power
towards workers, however, innovations — and especially labour saving tech-
nical progress — tend to increase equilibrium profits. These results would
seem to confirm the main intuition of OT and provide a further obituary on
Marx’s theory of the falling rate of profit. In this section, we show that, at a
general level, this conclusion would be unwarranted — or would at least need
to be qualified — and there are indeed some ex ante profitable innovations
that may lead to a decrease in the equilibrium rate of profit.
Our first result characterises the conditions under which profitable CS-LU
change of technique leads to a falling rate of profit:
Theorem 7: Let
³
(pt−1, wt−1) ,
¡
(A,L) ; ξνt−1;ωνt−1
¢
ν∈Nt−1
´
be a persistent
CE with πmaxt−1 > 0 and wt−1 > pt−1b for E(Nt−1;Bt−1; b;Ωt−2). Let (A∗, L∗) ∈
Bt (ωt−1, b) \Bt−1 be a new technique. Let inter-period change of technique
from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗) be profitable, CS-LU, and labour inelastic. Then,
there exists a CE
¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
with π∗maxt = 0 for
E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1) if and only if
(A∗, L∗) ∈ arg min
(A0,L0)∈Pt
L0 (I −A0)−1 b. (8)
Proof: (⇐) Let
¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
be a CE with π∗maxt = 0.
By construction, at prices (p∗t , w
∗
t ) with p
∗
t = w
∗
t v
∗ and w∗t =
1
v∗b , π∗t (A0, L0) 5
0 = π∗t (A∗, L∗) holds for all (A0, L0) ∈ Bt. Suppose, contrary to the statement,
that for some (A0, L0) ∈ Bt, 1v0b > 1v∗b . Then, by Proposition 5.2 in Kurz and
Salvadori [10]), it follows that (A0, L0) yields a higher profit rate than (A∗, L∗)
in at least some sectors at (p∗t , w
∗
t ), a contradiction.
30
(⇒) 1. Let (A∗, L∗) ∈ argmin(A0,L0)∈Bt L0 (I −A0)
−1 b. Then 1
v0b 5 1v∗b
holds for all (A0, L0) ∈ Bt. Therefore by Lemma 3 it follows that (A∗, L∗) is
optimal at p∗t = w
∗
t v
∗ > 0 and w∗t =
1
v∗b .
Since (A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt (ωt−1, b), x∗t ≡ A∗−1ωt−1 > 0, and the argument
used in the proof of Theorem 3(ii) can be adapted to prove that Nt =
30For a statement of Proposition 5.2 in Kurz and Salvadori [10] see the Addendum.
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LA−1ωt−1 < L∗A∗−1ωt−1. Then, let k ≡ NtL∗A∗−1ωt−1 < 1. For all ν ∈ Nt,
consider (ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt ) such that p∗tA∗x∗νt = p∗tkωνt−1, p∗t δ∗νt = p∗t (1− k)ωνt−1,
l∗νt = 1, and ω∗νt is such that equation (6) holds. Any such (ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt ) is opti-
mal at (p∗t , w
∗
t ), given (A
∗, L∗), and Definition 1(a) is satisfied for any profile
((A∗, L∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt.
2. Among the set of profiles in step 1, choose (ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt such that
x∗t = A
∗−1kωt−1, δ∗t = (1− k)ωt−1 and ω∗t = x∗t + δ∗t − bL∗x∗t . Then it
immediately follows that Definition 1(b) holds. By the definition of k and
l∗νt = 1 all ν ∈ Nt, l∗t = Nt = L∗x∗t and Definition 1(c) also holds.
3. Because (A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt (ωt−1, b), it follows that (I − bL∗)A∗−1ωt−1 =
0. Then, by construction, we have (I − bL∗)A∗−1kωt−1 = 0. Therefore
(I − bL∗)x∗t = 0 which in turn implies x∗t +δ∗t = bL∗x∗t . The latter inequality
proves that Definition 1(d) holds, as ω∗t = x∗t +δ∗t−bL∗x∗t . Finally, (A∗, L∗) ∈
Bt (ωt−1, b) implies (I − bL∗)x∗t = 0, and so x∗t = Ntb > 0.
In summary,
¡
(p∗, w∗t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
constitutes a CE with
π∗maxt = 0.
Theorem 7 shows the existence of innovations that are profitable from the
viewpoint of an individual capitalist but which, if adopted universally, lead
the equilibrium rate of profit to fall. From a broad theoretical perspective,
this result contradicts OT and may therefore be dubbed the Anti-Okishio
Theorem. It rigorously derives the conditions under which individually ra-
tional actions lead to collectively suboptimal outcomes, an intuition which is
at the core of Marx’s theory of technical change. But Theorem 7 also shows
some interesting and perhaps surprising connections between the theory of
the falling rate of profit and some central insights of classical capital theory.
As an illustration, and without any loss of generality, consider the simplest
possible case of technical change, whereby only one technique is known in
period t − 1, so that Bt−1 = {(A,L)} and Bt = {(A,L) , (A∗, L∗)}. Under
the conditions of Theorem 7, the wage-profit curve of the new technique,
πw (A∗, L∗), dominates the wage-profit curve of (A,L), πw (A,L), at least
in a neighbourhood of points
¡
0, 1
v∗b
¢
and (Π (A∗) , 0),31 as well as in the
non-empty subset πw ¡A∗, L∗; ¡πmaxt−1 , wt−1¢¢.32
31The former follows noting that if (8) holds, then 1v0b 5
1
v∗b for all (A
0, L0) ∈ Bt
and πw (A∗, L∗) coincides with the wage-profit frontier πw (Bt) in a neighbourhood of
(π∗maxt , w∗t ) =
¡
0, 1v∗b
¢
. The latter follows noting that A∗ ≤ A implies Π (A∗) > Π (A).
32Because technical change is profitable, an argument similar to that used for Theorem
5 shows that the set πw ¡A∗, L∗; ¡πmaxt−1 , wt−1¢¢ is non-empty and coincides with πw (Bt).
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Then, there are two scenarios in which the profit rate will fall. In the
first, πw (A∗, L∗) completely dominates πw (A,L) as shown in Figure 5.
Insert Figure 5 around here.
In this case, technical change is profitable at any prices and yet, according to
Theorem 7 the adoption of (A∗, L∗) leads the equilibrium profit rate to drop
to zero. This is quite a strong — and perhaps surprising — result from a the-
oretical viewpoint, but it is possibly of limited empirical relevance, because
innovations that are profitable at any prices are rare.
Alternatively, if πw (A∗, L∗) does not completely dominate πw (A,L), and
given that the former dominates the latter in at least three regions, the two
curves must intersect at least twice, as shown in Figure 6.
Insert Figure 6 around here.
Figure 6 describes a situation in which a reswitching of techniques (Kurz
and Salvadori [10], p.148) occurs: because 1
vb
< 1
v∗b , close to the vertical axis
the wage-profit frontier coincides with the wage-profit curve of the technique
(A∗, L∗), which is therefore optimal for a sufficiently small (or zero) profit
rate. Further, as (A∗, L∗) is the optimal technique at π∗ = 0, the correspond-
ing wage rate, w∗ = 1
v∗b is higher than the wage rate, w =
1
vb
, associated with
π = 0 under (A,L). In this case, as well-known in the literature on the
Cambridge capital controversy, the capital-labour ratio of (A∗, L∗) is higher
than that of (A,L) when the values of capital are measured by means of the
commodity price vectors corresponding to each of the two switching points,
and so (A∗, L∗) is a more capital-intensive technique than (A,L).
As the profit rate increases, a switching point arrives after which the fron-
tier coincides with πw (A,L) and the more labour-intensive technique (A,L)
becomes optimal. However, since Π (A∗) > Π (A) another switching point
exists after which, as the profit rate increases further, the capital intensive
technique (A∗, L∗) becomes optimal again — a phenomenon known in the
literature as capital reversing (Kurz and Salvadori [10], pp.447-451).
In other words, setting aside the empirically less relevant case of an in-
novation unambiguously dominating older techniques, the above arguments
show that there exists an interesting relation between capital theory — and
the phenomena known as reswitching of techniques and capital reversing, —
and the theory of the falling rate of profit.33
33The above arguments may perhaps also explain why the possibility of profitable in-
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How robust is the insight of Theorem 7? Does the equilibrium profit rate
fall as a result of profitable, CS-LU technical change if condition (8) is not
satisfied, or — more strongly — if technical change is regressive? This is not
obvious. By Theorem 3(ii), if technical change is CS-LU and regressive, the
new technique will not be adopted in equilibrium, even if it is profitable. In
this case, either an equilibrium emerges in which an old technique is adopted,
or no equilibrium exists — as in the case discussed in section 6.2. Theorem 8
addresses the first scenario.
Theorem 8: Let
³
(pt−1, wt−1) ,
¡
(A,L) ; ξνt−1;ωνt−1
¢
ν∈Nt−1
´
be a persistent
CE with πmaxt−1 > 0 and wt−1 > pt−1b for E(Nt−1;Bt−1; b;Ωt−2). Let (A∗, L∗) ∈
Bt (ωt−1, b) \Bt−1 be a new technique. Let inter-period change of technique
from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗) be profitable, CS-LU, labour inelastic, and regressive.
Let there be a technique (A∗∗, L∗∗) ∈
£
argmin(A0,L0)∈Bt−1 L
0 (I −A0)−1 b
¤
∩
Bt−1 (ωt−1, b) such that (A∗∗, L∗∗) 6= (A∗, L∗).34 Then, there exists a CE¡
(p∗∗t , w
∗∗
t ) , ((A
∗∗, L∗∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
with π∗∗maxt < πmaxt−1 forE (Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1)
if and only if Nt 5 L∗∗A∗∗−1ωt−1.
Proof: (⇒) Assume Nt 5 L∗∗A∗∗−1ωt−1. We prove that there is a CE¡
(p∗∗t , w
∗∗
t ) , ((A
∗∗, L∗∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
forE(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1)with π∗∗maxt < πmaxt−1 .
Consider (A∗, L∗). Observe that (π∗maxt , w∗t ) =
¡
0, 1
v∗b
¢
∈ πw (A∗, L∗)
with p∗ = (1 + π∗t ) p∗A∗ + w∗tL∗ where p∗ = v∗v∗b . Because technical change
from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗) is regressive, it follows that vb < v∗b and by the
definition of A∗∗, v∗∗b < v∗b. Therefore, at
¡
1
v∗bv
∗, 1
v∗b
¢
, technical change
from (A∗, L∗) to (A∗∗, L∗∗) is profitable. Hence, as in step 1 of the proof of
Theorem 5, we can find a price vector (p0t, w
0
t) ∈ 4× R+ with w0t = 1v∗b and
p0t = (1 + π0maxt ) p0tA∗∗ + w0tL∗∗ for some π0maxt > π∗maxt = 0.
Since (π0maxt , w0t) ,
¡πmaxt−1 , wt−1¢ ∈ πw (Bt−1), and πw (Bt−1) is downward
sloping, w0t > wt−1 implies π0maxt < πmaxt−1 . (Note that w0t 5 wt−1 is impossible
because the change from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗) is profitable at (pt−1, wt−1).)
Suppose Nt = L∗∗A∗∗−1ωt−1. Since (A∗∗, L∗∗) ∈ Bt−1 (ωt−1, b), then as
shown in the proof of Theorem 5, there exists a CE
¡
(p∗∗t , w
∗∗
t ) , ((A
∗∗, L∗∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
with (p∗∗t , w
∗∗
t ) = (p
0
t, w
0
t) and so π∗∗maxt = π0maxt < πmaxt−1 .
novations leading to a falling rate of profit is usually excluded in standard neoclassical
growth models. For, reswitching of techniques and capital reversing emerge when capital
is modelled as a bundle of reproducible commodities, as in this paper, rather than as a
single homogeneous aggregate, as in standard neoclassical macro models.
34Note that (A∗∗, L∗∗) could be equal to (A,L).
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Suppose Nt < L∗∗A∗∗−1ωt−1. Since (A∗∗, L∗∗) ∈ Bt−1 (ωt−1, b), then as
shown in the proof of Theorem 7, there exists a CE
¡
(p∗∗t , w
∗∗
t ) , ((A
∗∗, L∗∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
with (p∗∗t , w
∗∗
t ) =
¡
1
v∗∗bv
∗∗, 1
v∗∗b
¢
and so π∗∗maxt = 0 < πmaxt−1 .
(⇐) Let
¡
(p∗∗t , w
∗∗
t ) , ((A
∗∗, L∗∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
be a CE forE(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1)
with π∗∗maxt < πmaxt−1 . Suppose, by way of contradiction, thatNt > L∗∗A∗∗−1ωt−1.
Then at the CE it must be w∗∗t = 1 5 wt−1, which contradicts the assumption
that π∗∗maxt < πmaxt−1 .
Theorem 8 suggests that the insight of Theorem 7 is indeed robust: there
exist a range of scenarios in which the emergence of individually profitable in-
novations leads to a decline in the equilibrium rate of profit. The mechanism
highlighted in Theorem 8, however, is rather different and the result pro-
vides an original perspective on the debates on the falling rate of profit. For
it shows that technical progress may indeed lead to a decline in profitability
because of the general equilibrium effects of innovations even though, unlike
in Theorem 7, the new technique is not adopted in equilibrium.
The main effect of innovations, in Theorem 8, is to disrupt consoli-
dated production activities. The appearance of the new, profitable technique
(A∗, L∗) leads agents to abandon old production methods, moving the econ-
omy away from equilibrium. The new technique is not optimal at any CE,
however, because it implies a CS-LU and regressive type of technical change,
and therefore is not adopted. One may imagine an equilibrating process of
trial and error in which the economy deviates from the original price system
(pt−1, wt−1) and eventually settles on another equilibrium in which a pre-
viously suboptimal technique, (A∗∗, L∗∗), is adopted.35 If capital becomes
relatively abundant and Nt < L∗∗A∗∗−1ωt−1, then the profit rate falls to
zero. However, and perhaps more surprisingly, Theorem 8 proves that there
is a decrease in the equilibrium profit rate even if the economy moves to an
equilibrium with full employment of labour and capital, Nt = L∗∗A∗∗−1ωt−1,
although in this case the new equilibrium profit rate is positive.
Two additional comments are in order. First, note that the existence of
(A∗∗, L∗∗) is not a very restrictive condition. For, because the change from
(A,L) to (A∗, L∗) is regressive, then there must exist (A∗∗, L∗∗) 6= (A∗, L∗)
such that (A∗∗, L∗∗) ∈ argmin(A0,L0)∈Bt L0 (I −A0)
−1 b.
35Interestingly, although technical change to (A∗, L∗) would be CS-LU, the production
activity that is actually adopted in equilibrium is more capital intensive than the original
technique (A,L), where the value of capital is evaluated based on the commodity prices
corresponding to the switching point of these techniques on πw (Bt−1).
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Second, Theorems 7 and 8 hold under the assumption of full employment
of labour at the persistent CE in t−1. What if, instead, there is a sufficiently
big industrial reserve army of the unemployed? It can be shown that if Nt >
LA−1ωt−1, then a profitable CS-LU change of technique will be adopted in
equilibrium, and lead to an increase in the profit rate, provided it is gradual.36
This scenario could obtain, for example, in a developing economy in which
aggregate capital is still low relative to the labour force.
Theorems 7 and 8 prove that CS-LU changes of technique may cause the
profit rate to fall. Is this the only scenario that may lead to a decrease in
the rate of profit? Not really. Theorem 9 proves that if general equilibrium
effects are considered, then the profit rate may fall even in the standard case
of CU-LS change of technique.37
Theorem 9: Let
³
(pt−1, wt−1) ,
¡
(A,L) ; ξνt−1;ωνt−1
¢
ν∈Nt−1
´
be a persistent
CE with πmaxt−1 > 0 for E(Nt−1;Bt−1; b;Ωt−2). Let (A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt\Bt−1 be
such that (A∗, L∗) /∈ Bt (ωt−1, b). If inter-period change of technique from
(A,L) to (A∗, L∗) is profitable and CU-LS, then it results in a new CE¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; (x∗νt ; 1; δ∗νt ) ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
with π∗maxt = 0 forE(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1)
if and only if (1) there exists x∗ > 0 such that (I − bL∗)x∗ = A∗x∗−ωt−1 with
A∗x∗ ≤ ωt−1 andL∗x∗ = Nt; and (2) (A∗, L∗) ∈ argmin(A0,L0)∈Bt L0 (I −A0)−1 b.
8 Conclusions
Our results paint a much more complex picture of the effects of innova-
tions than in standard neoclassical theory and in the literature on OT. At a
broad theoretical level, they vindicate the basic intuitions of Marx’s theory
of technical change. There is no obvious relation between ex-ante profitable
innovations and the (functional) distribution of income that emerges in equi-
librium after technical change is implemented. If technical change leads to
an equilibrium with full employment of productive factors, the distribution
of income is undetermined, and it is even possible for either the profit rate
or the wage rate to decrease. More generally, individually rational choices of
technique do not necessarily lead to ex post optimal outcomes. There exist
36For a formal statement, see the Addendum.
37The proof of Theorem 9 is similar to that of Theorems 7 and 8 — noting that (A∗, L∗) /∈
Bt (ωt−1, b) leads to π∗maxt = 0 as shown in Theorem 3(i) — and is therefore omitted. (See
the Addendum.)
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a set of innovations that are profitable — at current prices — for individual
capitalists which lead either to socially sub-optimal outcomes characterised
by a decrease in labour productivity, or to a falling rate of profit, when they
are universally adopted thus causing equilibrium prices to change.
Methodologically, our analysis suggests that the distributive effects of
technical progress cannot be fully understood in models that do not capture
the dialectic between individual choices and aggregate outcomes, and the
complex network of relations that characterise capitalist economies. This is
a major limitation of most of the literature on OT, which does not explicitly
analyse the general equilibrium effects of innovations and usually assumes
profitable new techniques to be adopted. In contrast, a general equilibrium
approach to technical change allows us to model some aspects of the Schum-
peterian process of creative destruction. Innovations disrupt consolidated
production practices and move an economy away from its original equilib-
rium. Indeed, we have shown that they may even cause the disappearance of
all equilibria and lead the economy to a persistent disequilibrium dynamics.
This methodological insight is, we believe, robust and our theoretical ap-
proach provides a rich framework for the analysis of innovations. In closing,
we briefly mention three possible extensions of our analysis. First, we have
focused only on process innovations — new ways of combining inputs in the
production of a given set of goods. It would be interesting to investigate
the distributive effects of product innovations — the invention of new goods
and services. Second, given our focus on the effect of the appearance of
innovations on the functional distribution of income, we have not explicitly
modelled the process of discovering new techniques. Yet, from the general
equilibrium perspective adopted in our paper, it would be interesting to en-
dogenise R&D activities and investment, and then examine how the decisions
of R&D investors interact with the choices of capitalists in productive sectors
in driving changes in the equilibrium income distribution (for a preliminary
analysis in an one-good model, see Cogliano et al. [5]). Finally, we have
followed the classical literature on OT by focusing on economies with homo-
geneous labour. It would be worth extending our analysis to more complex
models with heterogeneous labour inputs: in addition to allowing for a richer
picture of production processes, and of innovations, this would also provide
a more nuanced analysis of the distributive effects of innovations which goes
beyond the stark two-class framework of the canonical classical model by in-
cluding cleavages within the working class (for example, between high-skilled
and low-skilled workers).
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ሺ𝐴∗, 𝐿∗ሻ is more profitable than ሺ𝐴, 𝐿ሻ at ሺ𝑝, 𝑤௧ሻ 
ሺ𝐴, 𝐿ሻ ∈ 𝑃௧ିଵ 
ሺ𝐴∗, 𝐿∗ሻ ∈ 𝑃௧\𝑃௧ିଵ 
Equilibrium transition from ሺ𝑝, 𝑤௧ିଵሻ with ሺ𝐴, 𝐿ሻ 
to ሺ𝑝∗, 𝑤௧ሻ wit ሺ𝐴∗, 𝐿∗ሻ, where 𝑤௧ ൌ 𝑤௧ିଵ 
and     𝜋௧ିଵ௠௔௫ ൏ 𝜋௧∗௠௔௫.      
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𝐴∗ ൒ 𝐴 and 𝐿∗ ൑ 𝐿 (CU-LS technical change) 
𝑤௧ିଵ is sufficiently close to 1 (subsistence wage rate) 
Equilibrium transition from ሺ𝑝, 𝑤௧ିଵሻ with ሺ𝐴, 𝐿ሻ 
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Figure 5 
Equilibrium transition from ሺ𝑝, 𝑤௧ିଵሻ 
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Abstract
Section 1 contains the proofs omitted in the paper. Section 2 re-
ports some results by Kurz and Salvadori [2] used in the proofs of
Theorems 5 and 7 in the paper. Section 3 shows an example of nonex-
istence of equilibrium after profitable, CS-LU, L-labour inelastic, and
regressive technical change. Section 5 provides a formal statement
of the distributive implications of technical progress in developing
economies. Section 6 provides the proof of existence of equilibrium.
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1
1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: The result follows immediately from equation (6).
Proof of Lemma 2: At a CE, as xt > 0 holds, πmaxt = 0 must hold. Indeed,
if πmaxt < 0, then xνt = 0 constitutes an optimal action at the CE for every ν.
Moreover, since only sectors yielding the maximum profit rate are activated
at the solution to MP νt , xt > 0 implies that pt = (1 + πmaxt ) ptAt + wtLt
holds. Then, by the productiveness and the indecomposability of At, pt =
πmaxt ptAt (I −At)−1+wtLt (I −At)−1 > 0 holds. Finally, xt > 0 implies that
Ltxt > 0 and therefore by Definition 1(c) and (6), it must be wt = ptb.
Proof of Theorem 1: Part (i). By Lemma 1, ptAtxνt = ptωνt−1 and lνt = 1
for all ν ∈ Nt. Then, ptAtxt = ptωt−1 holds, and by Definition 1(c), Ltxt =
lt = Nt. By Lemma 2, pt > 0. Therefore, ptAtxt = ptωt−1 and Definition
1(b), imply Atxt = ωt−1. Since xt = A−1t ωt−1, then Nt = LtA−1t ωt−1 holds.
Part (ii). Suppose, contrary to the statement, that wt > ptb. Then, by
Lemma 1, lνt = 1, all ν ∈ Nt. But, then noting that Atxt 5 ωt−1 by Definition
1(b), Nt > LtA−1t ωt−1, implies that Ltxt < lt holds, contradicting Definition
1(c).
Part (iii). Suppose, contrary to the statement, that πmaxt > 0. Then, by
Lemma 1, ptAtxνt = ptωνt−1, for all ν ∈ Nt, and so ptAtxt = ptωt−1. Therefore
since by Lemma 2 pt > 0 holds, Definition 1(b) implies Atxt = ωt−1. But,
since Nt < LtA−1t ωt−1, Ltxt > lt holds, contradicting Definition 1(c).
Proof of Proposition 2: By Lemma 2, since the change of technique is prof-
itable,
¡
1 + πmaxt−1
¢
pt−1A+wt−1L = pt−1 ≥
¡
1 + πmaxt−1
¢
pt−1A
∗+wt−1L
∗, which
implieswt−1L = pt−1−
¡
1 + πmaxt−1
¢
pt−1A andwt−1L∗ ≤ pt−1−
¡
1 + πmaxt−1
¢
pt−1A
∗.
(i) Therefore, if the change of technique is CU-LS:
wt−1 (L− L∗) ≥
¡
1 + πmaxt−1
¢
pt−1 (A
∗ −A) = pt−1 (A∗ −A) ≥ 0.
Then, since pt−1
wt−1
= v, (L− L∗) ≥ v (A∗ −A) ≥ 0 holds. This implies L +
vA ≥ L∗ + vA∗ ⇔ v ≥ L∗ + vA∗. Therefore, v (I −A∗) ≥ L∗, which implies
[v (I −A∗)− L∗] (I −A∗)−1 > 0 by (I −A∗)−1 > 0. Thus, v > v∗ holds.
(ii) In contrast, if the change of technique is CS-LU and v (A−A∗) ≤
(L∗ − L), then 0 ≤ v (A−A∗) ≤ (L∗ − L) holds. Then, v = vA + L ≤
vA∗+L∗. Thus, [v (I −A∗)− L∗] ≤ 0. Then, by multiplying (I −A∗)−1 > 0
from the right, we have v − v∗ < 0.
2
2 Auxiliary results from Kurz and Salvadori
[2]
Proposition 5.1 (Kurz and Salvadori [2]): Let (π, w) ∈ πw (A,L) with
p = (1 + π) pA + wL for some p ∈ 4. If there is a technique (A0, L0) ∈ Bt
such that the change from (A,L) to (A0, L0) is profitable at (p,w), then there
exists a technique (A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt such that for some (p∗, w∗) ∈ 4× R+ with
w∗ > w, p∗ = (1 + π) p∗A∗ + w∗L∗.
Proposition 5.2 (Kurz and Salvadori [2]): Let (A,L) , (A0, L0) ∈ Bt be
such that (π, w) ∈ πw (A,L) with p = (1 + π) pA + wL for some p ∈ 4,
(π, w0) ∈ πw (A0, L0) with p0 = (1 + π) p0A0 + w0L0 for some p0 ∈ 4, and
w0 > w > 0. Then, there exists a technique (A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt such that p ≥
(1 + π) pA∗ + wL∗.
3 Non-existence of equilibrium after profitable,
CS-LU, L-labour inelastic, and regressive
technical change
Note that the second scenario is available in a situation that in addition
to the present technique (A,L) ∈ Bt−1 and the new discovered technique
(A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt\Bt−1, there is another technique (A∗∗, L∗∗) ∈ Bt−1 which was
not used in the previous period such that Nt > L∗∗A∗∗−1ωt−1. In this case,
even if the third alternative technique (A∗∗, L∗∗) is the most progressive one
in the sense of (A∗∗, L∗∗) ∈ argmin(A0,L0)∈Bt−1 L0 (I −A0)
−1 b ∩ Bt−1 (ωt−1, b),
it could not necessarily constitute an equilibrium. More precisely, unless
a reswitching structure between the two wege-profit curves πw (A,L) and
πw (A∗∗, L∗∗) is observed, the economy may not reach to any equilibrium in
period t, as Figure 7 describes.
Figure 7 around here.
In Figure 7, the change from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗) is profitable at (p,wt−1).
Therefore, the economy shifts to a price system associated with (A∗, L∗) as
an optimal technique. However, since this change is CS-LU,Nt < L∗A∗−1ωt−1
so that the economy shifts to the price system
¡
1
v∗bv
∗, 1
v∗b
¢
with zero profit
rate. However, given that price system, (A∗∗, L∗∗) is more profitable so that
3
the change from (A∗, L∗) to (A∗∗, L∗∗) occurs at
¡
1
v∗bv
∗, 1
v∗b
¢
, which also leads
to a further change of price system to (p∗∗, w∗∗) ∈ 4×R+ with w∗∗ = 1v∗b and
p∗∗ =
¡
1 + πp∗∗,w∗∗¢ p∗∗A∗∗ + w∗∗L∗∗ for some πp∗∗,w∗∗ > 0. However, since
Nt > L
∗∗A∗∗−1ωt−1 and w∗∗ > 1, (p∗∗, w∗∗) cannot be an equilibrium price
system so that the economy shifts to a price systemwith the subsistence wage.
However, as Figure 6 describes, πw (A∗, L∗) covers the wage-profit frontier
at around the subsistence wage level, so that the change from (A∗∗, L∗∗) to
(A∗, L∗) occurs at such a price system. Then, since Nt < L∗A∗−1ωt−1 so
that the economy shifts to the price system
¡
1
v∗bv
∗, 1
v∗b
¢
with zero profit rate.
Thus, the same movement would repeat, so that it would not arrive at any
equilibrium in this situation.
4 Proof of Theorem 9
Theorem 9: Let
³
(pt−1, wt−1) ,
¡
(A,L) ; ξνt−1;ωνt−1
¢
ν∈Nt−1
´
be a persistent
CE with πmaxt−1 > 0 for E(Nt−1;Bt−1; b;Ωt−2). Let (A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt\Bt−1 be a
new technique such that (A∗, L∗) /∈ Bt (ωt−1, b). If inter-period change of
technique from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗) is profitable and CU-LS, then it results in
a new CE
¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
with ξ∗νt = (x∗νt ; 1; δ∗νt )ν∈Nt andπ∗maxt = 0 for E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1) if and only if (1) there exists x∗ > 0 such
that (I − bL∗)x∗ = A∗x∗ − ωt−1 with A∗x∗ ≤ ωt−1 and L∗x∗ = Nt; and (2)
(A∗, L∗) ∈ argmin(A0,L0)∈Bt L0 (I −A0)
−1 b. Moreover, there is no other CE
associated with (A∗, L∗) for E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1).
Proof of Theorem 9: (Only if part) Let
¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
be a CEwith ξ∗νt = (x∗νt ; 1; δ∗νt )ν∈Nt and π∗maxt = 0 < πmaxt−1 forE(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1)
be a CE after the profitable, CU-LS, and labor inelastic technical change. As
π∗maxt = 0, (p∗t , w∗t ) =
¡
1
v∗bv
∗, 1
v∗b
¢
holds, so that (A∗, L∗) ∈ argmin(A0,L0)∈Bt L0 (I −A0)
−1 b
should hold. Moreover, it follows that x∗t ≡
P
ν∈Nt x
∗ν
t > 0 and L
∗x∗t = N
by Definition 1(c)-(d). Noting (A∗, L∗) /∈ Bt (ωt−1, b), suppose A∗x∗t =ωt−1. Then, it implies that (I − bL∗)x∗t ¸ 0. However, by Definition 1(d),
(I − bL∗)x∗t + δ∗t = 0 must hold for δ∗t ≡ Pν∈Nt δ∗νt , which implies thatδ∗t ≥ 0. Then, A∗x∗t + δ∗t ≥ ωt−1, which constradicts Definition 1(b). There-
fore, A∗x∗t ≤ ωt−1 should hold, and δ∗t = ωt−1 − A∗x∗t . Thus, by Definition
1(d), (I − bL∗)x∗t = A∗x∗t − ωt−1.
(If part) Let there exist x∗ > 0 such that (I − bL∗)x∗ = A∗x∗−ωt−1 with
A∗x∗ ≤ ωt−1 andL∗x∗ = Nt; and let (A∗, L∗) ∈ argmin(A0,L0)∈Bt L0 (I −A0)−1 b.
4
Then, as shown in the proof of Theorem 7, (A∗, L∗) is optimal at (p∗t , w
∗
t ) ≡¡
1
v∗bv
∗, 1
v∗b
¢
. In this case, as w∗t > 1, l
∗ν
t = 1 is the optimal labour supply for
each ν ∈ Nt at (p∗t , w∗t ). Let δ∗ ≡ ωt−1 −A∗x∗ ≥ 0. Moreover, let ω∗t ≡ x∗ +δ∗−Nb = 0. Then, consider a suitable feasible assignment, (x∗ν, δ∗ν ,ω∗νt )ν∈Nt,
of (x∗, δ∗,ω∗t ) among all agents in Nt, in order to meet x∗νt = p
∗
tω∗νt−1
p∗tω∗t−1
x∗,
δ∗νt = p
∗
tω∗νt−1
p∗tω∗t−1
δ∗, and p∗tω∗νt = p∗tω∗νt−1 + w∗t − p∗t b for each ν ∈ Nt. Then,
(x∗ν, 1, δ∗ν;ω∗νt ) constitutes an optimal action for each ν ∈ Nt at (p∗t , w∗t ).
Thus, as the aggregation of the profile (x∗ν, 1, δ∗ν;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt satisfy Definitions
1-(b), 1-(c), and 1-(d), the profile
¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; (x∗ν, 1, δ∗ν ;ω∗νt ))ν∈Nt
¢
constitutes a CE. As (p∗t , w
∗
t ) =
¡
1
v∗bv
∗, 1
v∗b
¢
, π∗maxt = 0 holds.
Finally, to show that no other CE associated with (A∗, L∗), suppose that
there exists a CE
¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
with π∗maxt > 0. Then,
by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, A∗x∗t = ωt−1. Then, as (A∗, L∗) /∈ Bt (ωt−1, b), it
implies that (I − bL∗)x∗t ¸ 0. Then, as shown in (Only if part), we derive a
contradiction from Definition 1(b)-(d). Thus, no such CE exists.
5 CS-LUTechnical Change in Developing Economies
Consider a developing economy in which the social endowments of capital
stocks accumulated in the past are still very low relative to the size of pop-
ulation. In this case, it is natural to assume that a persistent CE is charac-
terised by Nt > LA−1ωt−1 and ask whether the premise of Theorem 4 can
be satisfied. This is particularly relevant if a CS-LU change of technique is
considered, as in the next result.
Theorem 10: Let
³
(p, wt−1) ,
¡
(A,L) ; ξνt−1;ωνt−1
¢
ν∈Nt−1
´
be a persistent CE
for E(Nt−1;Bt−1; b;Ωt−2) associated with Nt > LA−1ωt−1. Let (A∗, L∗) ∈
Bt (ωt−1, b) \Bt−1 be a new technique. Let inter-period change of technique
from (A,L) to (A∗, L∗) be profitable and CS-LUwith sufficiently small (A−A∗, L∗ − L).
Then, there exists a CE
¡
(p∗, w∗t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξ∗νt ;ω∗νt )ν∈Nt
¢
with w∗t = 1 andπ∗maxt > πmaxt−1 for E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1).
Proof: Straightforward adaptation of the proof of Theorem 6.
5
Theorem 10 shows that the premise of Theorem 4(ii) is satisfied: if there is
a sufficiently big industrial reserve army of the unemployed, then a profitable,
gradual, CS-LU change of technique will indeed be adopted in equilibrium,
and lead to an increase in the profit rate, even if this change of technique is
regressive.
Both the assumption Nt > LA−1ωt−1, and the characteristics of the
new equilibrium described in Theorem 9 are quite realistic in developing
economies, in which aggregate labour is abundant relative to the level of ac-
cumulated capital stock. These economies may wish to import the advanced
technology (a more capital-intensive technique) from advanced economies,
but their aggregate capital endowments are often insufficient to adopt capital-
intensive techniques. In this case, developing economies may modify such
advanced technology into a slightly more labour-intensive one, as in the case
of the Japanese economy just after the Meiji Revolution around the mid 19th
century (see, e.g., Allen [1]).
6 The existence of a persistent competitive
equilibrium
In this appendix, we analyse the existence of persistent CEs for an economy
E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1) with a set of agents Nt, a set of base techniques Bt, a
subsistence vector b, and a distribution of physical endowments Ωt−1, in
period t. As specified in section 6 of the main text, the wage-profit frontier
πw (Bt) is specified from the set Bt. Likewise, for each (A,L) ∈ Bt, the
wage-profit curve πw (A,L) associated with (A,L) is specified. Then, let
Bt ≡ {(A,L) ∈ Bt | ∃ (π, w) ∈ πw (A,L) ∩ πw (Bt) s.t. (π, w) ≥ (0, 1)} .
6.1 The existence of persistent CEs with full employ-
ment of all factors of production
Given an economy E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1) at period t with Nt+1, a set of endow-
ments of produced inputs is defined as follows:
C∗t
≡
½
ω ∈ Rn+ | ∃x∗ > 0 & (A,L) ∈ Bt: Ax
∗ = ω, (I − bL)x∗ ≥ 0, Lx∗ = Nt,
A−1 (x∗ −Ntb) > 0, LA−1 (x∗ −Ntb) = Nt+1
¾
.
6
We will show that ωt−1 ∈ C∗t is the necessary and sufficient condition for the
existence of persistent CEs with full employment of all productive factors.
First of all, let us show that the set C∗t is well-defined. To show it, let us
define
Bt (Nt, Nt+1) ≡
(
(A,L) ∈ Bt | L
∙
I − Nt+1
Nt
A
¸−1
b = 1
)
.
Then:
Theorem A.1: Consider an economy E(Nt;Pt; b;Ωt−1) at period t with
Nt+1. Then, if Bt (Nt, Nt+1) 6= ∅, then C∗t 6= ∅.
Proof. As Bt (Nt, Nt+1) 6= ∅, let (A,L) ∈ Bt (Nt, Nt+1). Let (1 + g) ≡
Nt+1
Nt
. Then, L [I − (1 + g)A]−1 b = 1 holds. The last equation implies
that there exists p ∈ 4 such that p ≡ L [I − (1 + g)A]−1 > 0. Therefore,
p = p [(1 + g)A+ bL] holds. The last equations imply that the Frobenius
eigenvalue of the matrix [(1 + g)A+ bL] is 1 associated with the unique
Frobenius eigenvector p > 0. Then, there exists the Frobenius eigenvec-
tor x∗ > 0 such that x∗ = [(1 + g)A+ bL]x∗ unique up to Lx∗ = Nt.
Then, (1 + g)Ax∗ = x∗ − Ntb holds. As (1 + g)Ax∗ > 0 by the inde-
composability of A and x∗ > 0, x∗ − Ntb = (I − bL)x∗ > 0. Moreover,
A−1 (x∗ −Ntb) = A−1 (1 + g)Ax∗ = (1 + g)x∗ > 0. Finally,
LA−1 (1 + g)Ax∗ = LA−1 (x∗ −Ntb)
which is equivalent to
(1 + g)Lx∗ = LA−1 (x∗ −Ntb)⇔
Nt+1
Nt
Nt = LA
−1 (x∗ −Ntb) .
Thus, by ω ≡ Ax∗, we can see that ω ∈ C∗t .
Note that for each (A,L) ∈ Bt, there exists π ∈ (0,Π (A)) such that
L [I − (1 + π)A]−1 b = 1 holds, due to the intermediate value theorem. Then,
if Bt contains sufficiently many alternative Leontief techniques, then it would
be likely to exist (A,L) ∈ Bt such that for some π = Nt+1Nt = −1, L [I − (1 + π)A]−1 b =
1 holds. Therefore, it would be likely that the set C∗t is non-empty.
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Theorem A.2: Consider an economy E(Nt;Pt; b;Ωt−1) at period t with
Nt+1. Then, there exists a persistent CE
¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξνt ;ωνt )ν∈Nt
¢
such that A∗x∗ = ωt−1 and L∗x∗ = Nt if and only if ωt−1 ∈ C∗t .
Proof. (Only if part) Let
¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξνt ;ωνt )ν∈Nt
¢
be a persistent
CE such that A∗x∗t = ωt−1 and L∗x∗t = Nt. As (π∗maxt , w∗t ) ≥ (0, 1) holds
in this case, (A∗, L∗) ∈ Bt holds. In this CE, ωt = x∗t − Ntb holds. As the
CE is persistent, ωt ≥ 0 holds, which implies that x∗t −Ntb = (I − bL) x∗t ≥
0. Moreover, by Proposition 1(i), A∗−1ωt > 0 holds, which implies that
A∗−1 (x∗t −Ntb) > 0. Finally, by Proposition 1(i), L∗A∗−1ωt = Nt+1. Thus,
L∗A∗−1 (x∗t −Ntb) = Nt+1 holds. In conclusion, ωt−1 ∈ C∗t holds.
(If part) Let ωt−1 ∈ C∗t hold. Then, there exist x∗ > 0 and (A,L) ∈ Bt
such that Ax∗ = ωt−1, (I − bL)x∗ ≥ 0, Lx∗t = Nt, A−1 (x∗ −Ntb) > 0, and
LA−1 (x∗ −Ntb) = Nt+1. As (A,L) ∈ Bt, there exists (π∗maxt , w∗t ) ≥ (0, 1)
such that for p∗t ≡ w∗tL [I − (1 + π∗maxt )A]−1 > 0,
p∗t = (1 + π∗maxt ) p∗tA+w∗tL 5 (1 + π∗maxt ) p∗tA0+w∗tL0 for any (A0, L0) ∈ Bt.
Then, for each ν ∈ Nt, a suitable optimal action profile (ξνt ;ωνt ) with ξνt =
(xν∗t , 1, 0) can be specified so as to satisfy
P
ν∈Nt x
ν∗
t = x
∗ and
P
ν∈Nt ωνt =ωt ≡ x∗ − Ntb ≥ 0. Thus, ¡(p∗t , w∗t ) , ((A,L) ; ξνt ;ωνt )ν∈Nt¢ is a CE with
the full employment of all productive factors. Finally, A−1ωt > 0 and
LA−1ωt = Nt+1 follow from A−1 (x∗ −Ntb) > 0 and LA−1 (x∗ −Ntb) = Nt+1
respectively, and ωt = x∗ −Ntb. Thus, Proposition 1 implies that this CE is
persistent.
6.2 The existence of persistent CEs with unemploy-
ment of labour
Given an economy E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1), let
B∗t ≡ {(A,L) ∈ Bt | ∃ (π, w) ∈ πw (A,L) ∩ πw (Bt) s.t. π > 0 & w = 1} .
Given an economy E(Nt;Bt; b;Ωt−1) at period t with Nt+1, a set of endow-
ments of produced inputs is defined as follows:
C∗∗t
≡
½
ω ∈ Rn+ | ∃x∗ > 0 & (A,L) ∈ B∗t : Ax
∗ = ω, (I − bL) x∗ ≥ 0, Lx∗ < Nt,
A−1 (I − bL)x∗ > 0, LA−1 (I − bL)x∗ < Nt+1
¾
.
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We will show that ωt−1 ∈ C∗∗t is the necessary and sufficient condition for
the existence of persistent CEs with unemployment of labour.
First, we will show that C∗∗t is well-defined:
Theorem A.3: Consider an economy E(Nt;Pt; b;Ωt−1) at period t with
Nt+1. Then, C∗∗t 6= ∅.
Proof. Let (A,L) ∈ B∗t . Then, by the intermediate value theorem, there
exists g(A,L) > 0 such that L
£
I −
¡
1 + g(A,L)
¢
A
¤−1
b = 1. The last equation
implies that there exists p ∈ 4 such that p ≡ L £I − ¡1 + g(A,L)¢A¤−1 > 0.
Therefore, p = p
£¡
1 + g(A,L)
¢
A+ bL
¤
holds. The last equations imply that
the Frobenius eigenvalue of the matrix
£¡
1 + g(A,L)
¢
A+ bL
¤
is 1 associated
with the unique Frobenius eigenvector p > 0. Then, there exists the Frobe-
nius eigenvector x∗ > 0 such that x∗ =
£¡
1 + g(A,L)
¢
A+ bL
¤
x∗ with Lx∗ <
Nt+1
1+g(A,L)
. Then,
¡
1 + g(A,L)
¢
Ax∗ = x∗ − bLx∗ > 0 holds by x∗ > 0 and the
indecomposability of A. Moreover, A−1 (I − bL)x∗ = A−1
¡
1 + g(A,L)
¢
Ax∗ =¡
1 + g(A,L)
¢
x∗ > 0 holds. Finally, we have
LA−1
¡
1 + g(A,L)
¢
Ax∗ = LA−1 (x∗ − bLx∗)
which is equivalent to
¡
1 + g(A,L)
¢
Lx∗ = LA−1 (x∗ − bLx∗). Then,
¡
1 + g(A,L)
¢
Lx∗ <
Nt+1 as Lx∗ <
Nt+1
1+g(A,L)
. Thus, LA−1 (x∗ − bLx∗) < Nt+1. Then, by ω ≡ Ax∗,
we can see that ω ∈ C∗∗t .
Theorem A.4: Consider an economy E(Nt;Pt; b;Ωt−1) at period t with
Nt+1. Then, there exists a persistent CE
¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξνt ;ωνt )ν∈Nt
¢
such that A∗x∗ = ωt−1 and L∗x∗ < Nt if and only if ωt−1 ∈ C∗∗t .
Proof. (Only if part) Let
¡
(p∗t , w
∗
t ) , ((A
∗, L∗) ; ξνt ;ωνt )ν∈Nt
¢
be a persistent
CE such that A∗x∗t = ωt−1 and L∗x∗t < Nt. As π∗maxt > 0 and w∗t = 1
hold in this case, (A∗, L∗) ∈ B∗t holds. In this CE, ωt = x∗t − bL∗x∗t holds.
As the CE is persistent, ωt ≥ 0 holds, which implies that (I − bL)x∗t ≥
0. Moreover, by Proposition 1(ii), A∗−1ωt > 0 holds, which implies that
A∗−1 (x∗t − bL∗x∗t ) > 0. Finally, as this CE is persistent with unemployment
of labour, it follows from Proposition 1(ii) that L∗A∗−1ωt < Nt+1. Thus,
L∗A∗−1 (x∗t − bL∗x∗t ) < Nt+1 holds. In conclusion, ωt−1 ∈ C∗∗t holds.
(If part) Let ωt−1 ∈ C∗∗t hold. Then, there exist x∗ > 0 and (A,L) ∈ B∗t
such that Ax∗ = ωt−1, (I − bL)x∗ ≥ 0, Lx∗ < Nt, A−1 (I − bL)x∗ > 0, and
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LA−1 (I − bL)x∗ < Nt+1. As (A,L) ∈ B∗t , there exist π∗maxt > 0 and w∗t = 1
such that for p∗t ≡ w∗tL [I − (1 + π∗maxt )A]−1 > 0,
p∗t = (1 + π∗maxt ) p∗tA+w∗tL 5 (1 + π∗maxt ) p∗tA0+w∗tL0 for any (A0, L0) ∈ Bt.
Then, for each ν ∈ Nt, a suitable optimal action profile (ξνt ;ωνt ) with ξνt =³
xν∗t ,
Lx∗
Nt
, 0
´
can be specified so as to satisfy
P
ν∈Nt x
ν∗
t = x
∗ and
P
ν∈Nt ωνt =
ωt ≡ x∗ − bLx∗. Thus, ¡(p∗t , w∗t ) , ((A,L) ; ξνt ;ωνt )ν∈Nt¢ is a CE with unem-
ployment of labour. Finally, A−1ωt > 0 and LA−1ωt < Nt+1 follow from
A−1 (I − bL) x∗ > 0 and LA−1 (x∗ − bLx∗) < Nt+1 respectively, noting that
ωt = x∗ − bLx∗. Thus, Proposition 1(ii) implies that this CE is persistent.
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Technical change from ሺ𝐴, 𝐿ሻ to ሺ𝐴∗, 𝐿∗ሻ is profitable at ሺ𝑝, 𝑤௧ିଵሻ 
ሺ𝐴, 𝐿ሻ, ሺ𝐴∗∗, 𝐿∗∗ሻ ∈ 𝑃௧ିଵ 
ሺ𝐴∗, 𝐿∗ሻ ∈ 𝑃௧\𝑃௧ିଵ 
𝐴∗ ൑ 𝐴 ൑ 𝐴∗∗ and 𝐿∗ ൒ 𝐿 ൒ 𝐿∗∗ (CS-LU technical change) 
with 𝑣∗ ൐ 𝑣 (regressive technical change) 
 
Transition from the equilibrium ሺ𝑝, 𝑤௧ିଵሻ with ሺ𝐴, 𝐿ሻ 
Does not arrive at a new equilibrium. 
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